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As people rely more heavily on online communication, privacy becomes an
increasingly critical concern. Users of communication services (e.g., email and mes-
saging) risk breaches of confidentiality due to attacks on the service from outsiders
or rogue employees, or even government subpoenas and network surveillance. End-
to-end encryption, in which anyone cannot read the user’s content, is the only way
to fully protect their online communications from malicious attackers, rogue com-
pany employees, and government surveillance. Although in recent years we have
witnessed considerable efforts to push end-to-end encryption into broader adoption,
and indeed several popular messaging tools have adopted end-to-end encryption,
some obstacles still remain which hinder general users from proactively and confi-
dently adopting end-to-end encrypted communication tools and acknowledge their
security benefits.
In this dissertation, we investigated the adoption of end-to-end encrypted com-
munication from a variety of user-centered perspectives. In the first part, we con-
ducted a lab study (n=52), evaluating how general users understand the balance
between the usability and security for different key management models in end-
to-end encryption. We found that participants understood the models well and
made coherent assessments about when different tradeoffs might be appropriate.
Our participants recognized that the less-convenient exchange model was more se-
cure overall, but found the security of the key-directory based model to be “good
enough” for many everyday purposes.
In the second part, we explored how general users value the usability and
security tradeoffs for different approaches of searching over end-to-end encrypted
messages. After systematizing these tradeoffs to identify key feature differences,
we used these differences as a basis for a choice-based conjoint analysis experiment
(n=160). We found that users indicated high relative importance for increasing pri-
vacy and minimizing local storage requirements. While privacy was more important
overall, after the initial improvement was made, further improvement was consid-
ered less valuable. Also, local storage requirement was more important than adding
marginal privacy.
Since significant research indicated that non-expert users’ mental models about
end-to-end encryption led them to make mistakes when using these tools, in the
third part of this dissertation, we took the first step to tackle this problem by
providing high-level, roughly correct information about end-to-end encryption to
non-expert users. In a lab study, participants (n=25) were shown one of several
variations on a short tutorial. Participants were asked about their understanding
of end-to-end encryption before and after the tutorial, as well as which information
they found most useful and surprising. Overall, participants effectively learned
many benefits and limitations of end-to-end encryption; however, some concerns
and misconceptions still remained, and our participants even developed new ones.
The results provided insight into how to structure new educational materials for
end-to-end encryption.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
As people rely more heavily on online communication, privacy becomes an
increasingly critical concern. Users of communication services (e.g., email and mes-
saging) risk breaches of confidentiality due to attacks on the service from outsiders
or rogue employees, or even government subpoenas and network surveillance. End-
to-end encryption, in which anyone cannot read the user’s content, is the only way
to fully protect their online communications from malicious attackers, rogue com-
pany employees, and government surveillance. Although in recent years we have wit-
nessed considerable effort to push end-to-end encryption into broader adoption [1–4],
and indeed several popular messaging tools such as WhatsApp and iMessage have
adopted end-to-end encryption, some obstacles still remain that hinder general users
from proactively and correctly using end-to-end encryption tools and acknowledging
their security benefits [5–8].
In this dissertation, we investigated the adoption of end-to-end encrypted com-
munications from a variety of user-centered perspectives which have not been ex-
plored before: first, how do users perceive the tradeoffs among different key man-
agement models in end-to-end encryption; second, how do users tradeoff for search
in encrypted communications; and third, how to help non-expert users understand
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better about end-to-end encryption so that they can use these tools more effortlessly
and confidently.
1.1 User Tradeoffs for Key Management Models
Progress toward better usability and thus wider adoption of end-to-end encryp-
tion has been made in recent years. Apple applied seamless end-to-end encryption
to its iMessage and FaceTime services [9,10]. By centrally distributing public keys,
Apple ensures the encryption is transparent to users, bringing end-to-end encryp-
tion to millions of iPhone, iPad, and Mac users. This design, however, leaves open
the possibility that Apple itself could carry out a man-in-the-middle attack to break
its users’ privacy, for example at the request of law enforcement authorities [11,12].
Popular messaging app WhatsApp has also implemented end-to-end encryption for
text, voice, and video communications [13]. As with iMessage, WhatsApp cen-
trally distributes public keys; however, users can optionally verify each other’s keys
manually or via QR code. Google and Yahoo! are reportedly developing similar ap-
proaches for email, with an added monitoring protocol that allows users and third
parties to audit the key directory for consistency and transparency [14–16]. Some
security experts have suggested that given this potential man-in-the-middle attack,
these services should not be recommended to end users. As just one example, one
security researcher suggests that “iMessage remains perhaps the best usable covert
communication channel available today if your adversary can’t compromise Apple.
... If one desires confidentiality, I think the only role for iMessage is instructing
2
someone how to use Signal 1” [12].
In a sense, the issue comes down to whether the benefit from many more people
adopting encrypted communications is outweighed by the reduced security inherent
in the central key distribution model. While security experts are best positioned to
understand the technical differences between models, end users will ultimately be
faced with the choice of which platforms and products to install and use. Researchers
have considered the needs of some highly privacy-sensitive users, such as journalists
and activists [17, 18]. To our knowledge, however, no one has asked average users
for their opinions about these tradeoffs. This means that although security experts
may understand the risks and benefits of different tools, as a community we do not
understand how an average user will weigh different factors in deciding whether to
adopt or ignore various encrypted communication technologies.
To understand how non-expert users feel about these tradeoffs, we undertook
a 52-person lab study. We introduced participants to two encryption models: an
exchange model in which participants manually exchange keys (analogous to tradi-
tional PGP) and a registration model in which participants sign up with a central
service that distributes keys (analogous to iMessage). For each model, we asked
them to complete several encrypted communication tasks; we also gave them a short,
high-level explanation of each model’s security properties. (We varied the order of
presentation to account for biases.) We then asked participants to comment on the
security and usability of each model, as well as their overall opinion of the tradeoffs
involved. The experiment was designed, insofar as possible, to avoid comparisons
1An end-to-end encrypted communication tool: https://whispersystems.org/
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based on user-interface design and focus instead on the underlying properties of each
encryption model.
We found that participants understood the two models fairly well and ex-
pressed nuanced insights into the tradeoffs between them. As predicted, participants
found the registration model considerably more convenient than the exchange model.
More interestingly, while the exchange system was considered more secure overall,
the difference was slight: both the general trust that large email providers would
not risk their reputations by cheating and reasonable concerns about participants’
own ability to correctly implement the exchange model mitigated this difference.
Separately, we asked about half of our participants to evaluate the auditing model
proposed in CONIKS [19], which is similar to that in maybe development by Google
and Yahoo!, and we found that for many users it provides a meaningful additional
degree of confidence in the registration model’s privacy.
Overall, our results suggest that users recognize the benefit of the exchange
model for very sensitive communications, but find the more-usable registration
model sufficient for the majority of everyday communications they engage in. While
there are risks to this model, some of which can be alleviated by auditing, we argue
that the marginal benefit of broad adoption will outweigh these risks. Historically,
encryption schemes that require significant user effort have never gained broad popu-
larity. Trying to convince average users to exclusively use more complicated schemes,
when they often don’t see a need for the added protection, may instead keep them
away from using any encryption at all. Rather than spreading undue alarm about
the risks of registration models, or forcing users into only exchange models, we rec-
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ommend that policymakers and designers present tradeoffs clearly and encourage
adoption of usable but imperfect security for the many scenarios where it may be
appropriate.
1.2 User Tradeoffs for Search in Encrypted Communication
In recent years, more online communication services, especially instant messag-
ing tools, have adopted end-to-end encryption; for example, WhatsApp and Apple’s
iMessage have brought end-to-end encrypted messaging to millions of users by de-
fault [9, 13]. While these popular tools have been moving in the right direction for
securing communication, email adoption has not caught up [5].
While end-to-end encryption provides important privacy benefits, it can com-
plicate functionality in a variety of ways that can potentially inconvenience end
users. As one example, message searching (i.e., recovering a previously sent or re-
ceived message using keywords) is a critical function for many users, especially for
email [20–22]. When messages are end-to-end encrypted, searching their contents
becomes complicated. Straightforward solutions in which the communication service
maintains a central searchable index cannot be applied directly, as the communi-
cation service cannot read and index messages. To avoid this, instant messaging
systems typically use a local index, in which messages decrypted on a device are
indexed (and can therefore be searched) on that device.
An alternative to local indexing is to support searching over encrypted con-
tent. During the past two decades, researchers have made significant progress on
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searchable encryption, or mechanisms that can support searching encrypted data on
an untrusted server without revealing the content of the messages or of the search
queries [23–28]. These techniques are gradually being adopted by industry, e.g.,
for databases. While they have not yet been applied specifically for messaging,
researchers have begun to explore this potential use case.
Both of these approaches to enable search for end-to-end encrypted messaging
have benefits and drawbacks, in terms of security properties and in terms of utility
for end users. To our knowledge, these tradeoffs have not been systematically ex-
plored from the point of view of end users. In this work, we take a first step toward
filling that gap. First, we systematize the tradeoffs of these solutions in four dimen-
sions: search expressiveness, performance, portability, and security across devices.
This approach allows us to identify key features (that apply to both messaging and
email) that may influence users’ preferences. We then apply this systematization
to design a choice-based conjoint analysis study focusing on email. We choose to
study email specifically because of the prominence of search in an email setting, as
well as the tendency for email archives to be relatively large and long-lived. Study
participants were asked to make a series of choices between email-service profiles
with different usability and security features; the results allow us to quantify the
importance of each feature relative to the others in the email setting [29–31]. This
methodology has been adopted in previous research to investigate users’ online pri-
vacy concerns [32–34].
Our experiment (n=160) compared six features that may affect users’ prefer-
ences for encrypted communication: price, multi-word search, partial-word search,
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privacy, local storage and synchronization across devices. We find that privacy is
the second-most important feature, after price: participants indicated they would
pay on average $0.85 per month to reduce service providers’ access to the contents
of their messages and search queries. However, minimizing the use of local storage
was almost as highly valued. We also find that participants’ web skills, along with
their self-reported level of privacy concern, influence their choices.
Our results suggest that users were able to understand the usability and pri-
vacy tradeoffs broadly. There is a potentially valuable niche for applying searchable
encryption rather than a local index to email messaging, to support users who want
more privacy than in an unencrypted service but who also highly prioritize limiting
space on mobile devices.
1.3 Improving Non-Experts’ Understanding of End-to-End Encryp-
tion
Despite significant improvement, recent research has shown that many non-
expert users have difficulty using end-to-end encryption (E2EE) correctly within
these tools and recognizing the security benefits they do (and don’t) provide [5, 6,
8,35]. These difficulties are not simply caused by poor usability or interface design;
rather, they occur in large part because users hold incorrect mental models of E2EE.
Even interfaces that hide the majority of the details of encryption and decryption
from users may require users to complete some tasks, such as authentication cere-
monies and key changes; without reasonable mental models for the process, users
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struggle to complete these tasks [6, 7, 36, 37]. Further, incorrect mental models can
cause users to wrongly believe that other communications approaches (such as stan-
dard text messaging) are more secure than E2EE messaging, or to believe that all
privacy protections are inevitably futile in the face of skilled adversaries, reducing
use of E2EE where it might be appropriate [5]. Additionally, incorrect mental mod-
els may lead users to underestimate valid risks, such as vulnerability to malware at
endpoints.
One ideal solution might be to design software that — in interface if not in
underlying technical operation — would “more closely align with users’ existing
mental models” [8]. However, this is likely to prove difficult (at least in the near
future), as existing models are fairly far from correct and not well aligned with the
inherent technical characteristics of encryption systems. Instead, enabling users to
make appropriate decisions about how to meet their privacy needs may require at
least somewhat improving mental models, perhaps via better explanations [8].
While it is neither possible nor desirable to ask all or even many users to be-
come cryptography experts, we can work to improve high-level mental models and
help non-expert users understand basic threat models and mitigations. In this work,
we take an initial step toward this goal by exploring how to explain high-level E2EE
concepts to non-experts, with a focus on what they find most important and sur-
prising. In a qualitative lab study (n=25), participants were shown a short tutorial
containing one or more modules explaining aspects of E2EE: a high-level overview;
details about the kinds of surveillance risks E2EE can and cannot protect against;
a debunking of common misconceptions; and a more detailed but only lightly tech-
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nical description of how E2EE works. Before and after the tutorial, participants
answered questions about their understanding of E2EE and its security properties.
We also asked participants to provide feedback on the tutorial contents, to critique
E2EE explanations drawn from popular messaging tools’ current documentation,
and to design a short explanation highlighting the most important aspects of E2EE.
Taken together, these tasks allow us to investigate how users respond to different
educational approaches, what aspects of E2EE they find most important or most
surprising, and which elements should be emphasized in future educational inter-
ventions. While we do not expect many general users will want to complete even
short formal tutorials like the ones we tested, we hope that insights from our study
can be used to inform the design of informal educational efforts, such as interstitial
informational screens within messaging apps.
We find that overall our tutorials are effective at conveying high-level security
properties of E2EE, including potential weaknesses at endpoints. They also correct
certain existing misconceptions about who has access to messages in transit. We
find that the risks module effectively conveys ideas about the relative risk of E2EE
and non-E2EE communications, but the misconceptions module does not effectively
address confusion about integrity and authenticity. The technical description in-
creased understanding somewhat for some participants, but also promoted misun-
derstanding for others, and was not considered particularly important or useful. The
critique activities, meanwhile, revealed several points of confusion within existing
messages. Overall, participants’ responses suggest that emphasizing confidentiality,
clearly conveying the limitations of E2EE protections, and reducing complexity are
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the most important properties for effective education.
1.4 Dissertation Structure
This dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 lists related work; Chap-
ter 3 describes how general users balance the tradeoffs of different key management
models in end-to-end encryption; Chapter 4 introduces general users’ tradeoffs for
search in encrypted communications; Chapter 5 presents our work to improve non-
expert users’ mental models about end-to-end encryption; Chapter 6 lists our rec-
ommendations to the community, and Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and
provides future research directions.
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Chapter 2: Related Work
In this chapter, we explained the work this dissertation built on. Our related
work includes the following areas: the history of end-to-end encryption; the usabil-
ity of end-to-end encryption; the social factors and mental models in end-to-end
encryption adoption; advances in searchable encryption; habits of email search, or-
ganization and mobile usage; application of conjoint analysis; and the educational
principles we followed to design our educational tutorials.
2.1 History of End-to-End Encryption
Diffie and Hellman proposed public-key cryptography in 1976, a cryptographic
system that used key pairs, where the public keys could be disclosed publicly, and the
private keys were only known to owners. Computing private keys from public keys
were computationally infeasible [38]. This work suggested that a public directory
would allow anyone to send private messages to anyone else; and in 1978, the RSA
algorithm made the idea practical [39]. This idea led to the OpenPGP standard
(RFC 4880) [40]. In 1991, John Zimmerman developed PGP, a software following
the OpenPGP standard which supported sending public-key encrypted email, where
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the RSA algorithm was used to encrypt session keys [41]. However, in this original
design, there was no guarantee that a public key was truly belonged to someone. To
alleviate this key verification problem, in the second version, he proposed a “web of
confidence” (later known as web of trust) for establishing key authenticity [42]. In
a web of trust, users can sign each others’ keys to endorse their authenticity, and
can choose to accept keys that come with signatures from “trusted introducers.”
Despite this, key verification has remained problematic for many years [2]. Several
other email systems also followed the OpenPGP standard, such as GPG Tools [43]
and web browser extension Mailvelope [44].
In 1999, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) published RFC 2633 that
defined Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), which takes a
centralized approach to key distribution: all users have public-key certificates signed
by a certification authority (CA), which are distributed along with any signed emails
sent by that user [45]. S/MIME allowed straightforward integration of encryption to
email clients like Microsoft Outlook and Netscape Communicator and was adopted
by some corporate organizations with the capability to manage keys hierarchically,
but was not adopted broadly by consumers.
However, both PGP and S/MIME don’t really take off. More recently, sev-
eral researchers and companies have explored ways to split the difference between
completely decentralized and completely centralized key management. Gutmann
proposed applying key continuity management (KCM), in which keys are trusted on
first use but key changes are detected (KCM verifies whether the current key is the
same as the previous one), to email [46]. In Apple’s iMessage, private keys are gen-
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erated on users’ devices and the corresponding public keys are uploaded to Apple’s
proprietary directory service. Since private keys are not shared among devices, when
sending a message to a user with multiple devices, the message is encrypted once for
each device [9,47]. A reported vulnerability in the iMessage encryption mechanism
points to the importance of validating the security of any end-to-end-messaging sys-
tem [48]. WhatsApp uses a related approach based on the Signal Protocol, but
allows users to confirm the authenticity of each other’s keys if they choose to [13].
Originally to monitor the certificate issuing in HTTPS, in certificate trans-
parency, publicly auditable append-only logs can be used to determine whether
rogue certificates have been signed using a stolen CA key [49]. Ryan extended this
approach for end-to-end email encryption in pursuit of less cumbersome and more se-
cure approaches to key management [50]. CONIKS extends certificate transparency
to allow users to efficiently monitor their own key entries and to support security
in the key directory [19]. Google and Yahoo! are exploring variations of this trans-
parency approach for their end-to-end encryption extension [15, 16]. Each of these
approaches trades off a different amount of security for convenience.
Other researchers have proposed alternatives to standard public-key encryp-
tion that are designed to be more usable. Fahl et al. proposed Confidentiality as
a Service (CaaS) [51], which operates on a registration model mostly transparent
to users. This approach uses symmetric cryptography and splits trust between the
communications provider and the CaaS provider. Neither individually can read
private messages, but if the two collude they can.
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2.2 The Usability of End-to-End Encryption
During the past two decades, researchers and practitioners have made a con-
siderable effort to understand problems with deployment of end-to-end encrypted
communication tools and make them more accessible to users.
In 1999, Whitten and Tygar published the now-seminal Why Johnny Can’t
Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP 5.0 [1]. This paper evaluated the interface
for PGP 5.0 and found that most users (two-thirds) were unable to successfully
sign and encrypt an email in the 90 minute session. This led to a series of follow-on
studies for improving user interface designs, such as mitigating problems identified in
previous systems [2,52], whether to adopt automatic encryption and decryption [4,
53], using understandable metaphors [54], designing more informative indicators [55],
and whether to integrate with existing systems [56].
Many researchers have focused on the problems of key exchange and manage-
ment in end-to-end encrypted systems [3, 19, 50, 51, 57, 58]. Garfinkel et al. eval-
uated key continuity management (KCM), and concluded that it was a workable
model. Fahl et al. evaluated their CaaS model in a Facebook messaging users
study, and found that participants could successfully use this approach to encrypt
Facebook conversations [57]. Lerner et al. proposed Confidante, a prototype that
used Keybase [59] to centrally manage public keys and also possibly private keys pro-
tected by users’ passwords [60]. They showed that lawyer and journalist participants
made fewer mistakes using Confidente made fewer mistakes than Mailvelope [44].
Some other studies evaluated modern end-to-end encrypted systems and found that
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users were still susceptible to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks due to human er-
rors [6,36,37,61,62]. Unger et al. surveyed secure communication tools in 2015, and
evaluated their security, usability and ease-of adoption properties [63].
These studies, except [63], largely ask users to do tasks they are unfamiliar
with and focus on success rates (key pairs generation and collection, sending and
decrypting messages, comparing fingerprints, etc.). They provide valuable insight
into how effectively novices can learn a particular system, how specific user interface
design choices impact users, and where the difficulties lie. However, users are rarely
presented with multiple potential encryption infrastructure models. One study was
conducted by Ruoti et al. compared the usability of three key management models:
passwords, public key-directory, and identity-based encryption [64]. We note that
this study was done after our work in Chapter 3 was published.
2.3 Social Factors and Mental Models in End-to-End Encryption
Adoption
Social factors and network effects play an important role in adoption of secure
messaging. McGregor et al. considered the specific security and encryption needs of
journalists protecting confidential sources, finding that adoption is frequently driven
by source preferences and that existing models do not meet some important jour-
nalistic needs, such as verifying the authenticity of sources [17]. When evaluating
Confidante, Lerner et al. also conducted a user study about journalists and lawyers.
Their findings suggested that journalists and lawyers had security and operational
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requirements “divergent enough that they may require different encrypted commu-
nication tools entirely” [60]. These studies suggest that to promote adoption of
encrypted messaging, the research community must consider the overall ecosystem
of features and tradeoffs within which users make adoption decisions.
Beyond explicit usability, users’ mental models have also been found to be
fundamental in influencing users’ decisions to (not) adopt encrypted communication
tools. Often, users believe that they have no reason to encrypt their email because
they have “nothing to hide,” or because they cannot imagine anyone being interested
in the messages they are sending [65]. In an interview study at an unnamed non-
violent, direct-action (NVDA) organization (which one might expect to be more
interested and aware of the benefits of encryption), Gaw et al. found that employees
believed “routine use of encryption [was] paranoid [behavior]” [18].
Although E2EE has been more broadly adopted in messaging tools than in
email, DeLuca et al. found that users did not prioritize security and privacy when
selecting messaging apps [35]. Relatedly, Abu-Salma et al. found that “usability
is not the primary obstacle to adoption” [5]; instead, fragmented user bases, lack
of interoperability, and limited knowledge about security were significant barriers.
These researchers also found that users held misconceptions about the benefits and
weaknesses of E2EE — for example, believing that secure communications tools are
inevitably futile in the face of powerful hackers — that hinder adoption. Wu et
al. explored users’ (mis)conceptions of encryption in depth, identifying four mental
models of encryption [8].
The misconceptions identified by these studies imply that improving mental
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models could support adoption of secure messaging tools. To date, little research
has explored how to do this. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) published a
secure-messaging scoreboard to inform users about the security properties of various
messaging tools [66]; however, this effort was later abandoned because lay users had
difficulty understanding its contents [5]. Tong et al. tested a lock-and-key metaphor
for public and private keys [54], with preliminary results indicating some improved
understanding. We adopt this lock-and-key metaphor in a portion of our tuto-
rial, described below. Albese et al. explored a variety of different short metaphors
explaining the concept of E2EE but did not find any that were particularly success-
ful [67]. Other work has included brief user-education materials as part of a larger
study, but did not focus on how to design these materials effectively [6, 58,68].
2.4 Searchable Encryption
Searchable encryption was first introduced in 2000 by Song. et al., using a sym-
metric encryption scheme [23]. Since then, numerous works have improved search
efficiency and protocol security [24–28, 69, 70]. Many companies have integrated
searchable encryption capabilities into products, primarily database systems [71–75].
Fuller et al. provide an overview of searchable encryption solutions from academia
and industry, characterizing the tradeoffs between different solutions [76].
Although many searchable encryption solutions have been proposed and eval-
uated, to our knowledge, only two studies have been done to understand users’
perceptions toward such solutions. The first study was a 10-participant pilot that
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evaluated users’ experiences using a web interface to query searchably-encrypted
databases [76]. The study found that participants cared more about the expected
times than minimizing the mean response. The second study was a 13-participant
lab study about a Chrome extension which supported searching end-to-end en-
crypted emails in Gmail, where participants were provided an email set by re-
searchers and asked to search for specific keywords [77]. They claimed that en-
crypted search could be applied without violating usability of current non-encrypted
systems. We note that the later study was conducted after our work presented in
Chapter 4.
2.5 Email Search, Organization, and Mobile Usage
Searching emails, unlike other information retrieval tasks such as web search,
is to refind “stuff I have seen” [78]. Researchers have spent significant effort to
understand how users search their emails and help them to do so more effectively.
In a lab study, Elsweiler et al. explored some email search query characteristics
on Mozilla Thunderbird, e.g. the query length and the field submitted on [79]. They
found some factors about the email, such as the time the email was received, whether
the searched email was accessed recently, etc. had some correlation with users’ email
search query choices. In a followup field study, Harvey et al. discovered some search
behavioral patterns in email, such as whether and how often the same or similar
queries were submitted by the same user, and when users clicked through emails after
users performed a search [80]. They also found that some behaviors patterns in email
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search contrasted with those in web search. Whittaker et al. found that preparatory
behaviors such as creating folders are inefficient and do not improve email retrieval
success [81]. Cecchinato et al. found that users searched their emails in personal
and work account differently due to different email management strategies [20].
More recently, researchers have been able to examine search queries from large
email providers and identify broad patterns. Carmel et al. found that among Yahoo!
Mail users, most search queries are fully formulated by users (rather than suggested
by the email service), and most contain only one word [22]. Similar query lengths
were found in Outlook queries [21]. Among the Outlook queries, 18% contained
“advanced” search operators, primarily the “from:” and “to:” operators used to
specify email senders and recipients. Users are increasingly accessing emails via
mobile devices rather than desktops or laptops, reaching 62% in 2019 [82]. Another
email marketing report in 2018 also indicate that 75% of consumers say they use
their smartphones most often to check email [83].
These email habits will affect users’ preferences for searching encrypted as
well as plaintext email, and they informed the design of our choice-based analysis,
as detailed in Chapter 4.
2.6 Conjoint Analysis for Valuating Privacy
Conjoint analysis is a statistical method for understanding users’ relative pref-
erences among multiple-attribute products or services [29–31], and researchers have
adopted it to understand various aspects of users’ online privacy preferences. Kras-
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nova et al. used computer-aided Adaptive Conjoint Analysis (ACA) to investigate
users’ privacy values in online social networks (OSN) [33]. They expressed users’
preferences for different attributes, including privacy, in monetary value, which al-
lowed them to compare preferences among different features easily. In our study in
Chapter 4, we also adopt monetary values as a basis of comparison. Burda et al.
explored users’ cloud-storage choice decisions by employing a choice-based conjoint
analysis [34]. They found that users preferred client-side encryption over server-side
encryption, and estimated providing client-side encryption is equivalent to between
0.86 and 1.66 Euros per month. Pu et al. conducted both a full-profile and a choice-
based conjoint analysis to understand the factors that influence social app users’
valuation of their own and their friends privacy, measured by how much data was
collected by an app [32, 84]. They found that app users valued all of their friends’
privacy smaller than their own’s [32], but vice versa in [84]. Our work in Chapter 4
also adopted the choice-based conjoint analysis.
2.7 Design Principles for Educational Material
The principles and methods used in designing educational material and proce-
dures can have a significant impact on how users gain skills and learn new knowledge.
In the work presented in Chapter 5, we designed our tutorial to incorporate some
best practices from learning science.
The principle of contiguity states that “the effectiveness of multimedia in-
struction increases when words and pictures are presented contiguously (rather than
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isolated from one another)” [85]. We therefore designed our tutorial to include il-
lustrative slides with narration, and used pilot testing to identify a good balance
between graphics and words.
In line with recommendations to use first- and second-person point-of-view
and make educational materials conversational [86], we designed our examples of
encrypted communication to incorporate the participant as a sender/receiver.
Learning science also recommends giving learners opportunities to stop and
think about what they have learned, as well as learning-by-doing (“knowledge and
skills are acquired and strengthened through actual practice”) [87, 88]. We incor-
porated these ideas by asking participants repeatedly to reflect on what they had
learned in the tutorial and what they would want to share with family and friends,
as well as a design task exercising their new knowledge.
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Chapter 3: User Tradeoffs for Key Management Models
Historically, end-to-end encryption has been difficult for people to use, but
tools in recent years have made it more broadly accessible, largely by employing key-
directory services. These services sacrifice some security properties for convenience.
In a 52-person interview study, we asked participants to complete encryption tasks
using both a traditional key-exchange model and a key-directory-based registration
model. We also described the security properties of each and asked participants for
their opinions. We found that participants could learn to understand properties of
different encryption models and make coherent assessments about when different
tradeoffs might be appropriate. Participants recognized that a less convenient key
exchange model was more secure overall, but considered the key-directory approach
to have security sufficient for most everyday purposes.
3.1 Study Design
We used a within-subjects lab study to examine participants’ concerns and
preferences regarding the usability and security of end-to-end email encryption.
Each participant was introduced to two general models for key management, ex-
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change and registration. For both models, we described a public key as a public
lock. This approach, inspired by Tong et al., avoids overloading the term “key”
and was used to provide a more intuitive understanding of how public-key pairs
operate [54].
In the exchange model, similar to traditional PGP, participants generate a
key pair and then distribute the public locks to people they want to communicate
with. We offered participants several methods for exchanging locks: the same email
account they would use for encrypted communication, a secondary email account,
posting the public lock on Facebook or sending via Facebook Messages, or using a
simulated “key server” to upload their lock to a public directory. (These options
were presented to each participant in a random order.) Simulated correspondents
(played during the study by a researcher) sent back their own public locks via
the same mechanism the participant chose, or via the mechanism the participant
requested.
In the registration model, participants again generate a key pair. In this case,
they “register” their public lock with a simulated key directory service; correspon-
dents’ locks were pre-installed to simulate automatically retrieving them from the
directory. Participants were thus able to send and receive encrypted email from all
simulated correspondents immediately upon creating and registering their own keys.
In iMessage and other tools such as WhatsApp and Signal, the key generation step
itself is completely transparent to users, who may never realize a key was created; we
chose instead to make key generation explicit to help users understand the process.
Within each model, participants were asked to complete a series of simulated
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tasks, such as exchanging encrypted emails in a role-playing scenario (see details
below); they were also introduced to a brief, non-technical review of the security
properties of each model. Participants were asked to give their opinions about each
model immediately after completing the tasks and security learning for that model.
We also conducted an exit interview regarding the overall usability and security of
each model, whether participants would use it themselves or recommend it to others,
and in what circumstances it might or might not be appropriate.
We chose a within-subjects study because we were primarily interested in how
participants would understand and value the tradeoffs among the options. As shown
in Table 5.2, we varied the order of activities to account for ordering effects. Partic-
ipants were assigned round-robin to one of these four possible orders of activities.
First activity Second Third Fourth
ET (Exchange, Tasks) ES RT RS
ES (Exchange, Security learning) ET RS RT
RT (Registration, Tasks) RS ET ES
RS (Registration, Security learning) RT ES ET
Table 3.1: The order of activities varied across participants. Each participant worked
with either the Exchange (E) or the Registration (R) model first. Within each
model, participants either completed the encryption Tasks (T) first or learned about
Security properties (S) first. Throughout the dissertation, participants are labeled
by first activity; e.g., participant RT3 completed encryption tasks for the registration
model first.
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Figure 3.1: To use our extension, participants first generated (or registered) a key
pair. Participants using the exchange model then needed to import recipients’ locks.
Finally, when composing encrypted emails, they clicked the Encrypt button (shown
in the lower right of Step 3) to bring up a modal dialog to select recipients.
3.1.1 Encryption tasks
The set of encryption-related tasks for each model is shown in Table 3.2. In
both models, participants were asked to generate a key pair locally. In the exchange
model, participants then exchanged public locks with simulated friend Alice, in-
cluding both sending Alice their lock and importing the lock received in return. In
the registration model, participants registered with a simulated central service and
had their public lock automatically “uploaded” and others’ locks automatically “im-
ported.” After the locks were exchanged or the participant registered, participants
composed and sent an encrypted email to Alice. A researcher, posing as Alice, sent
an encrypted response. As a slightly more complex task, participants were asked
to send an encrypted email to a group of two recipients. This task was designed to
get participants to begin to consider how the two models scale. Finally, we asked
participants to consider how they would handle several other situations, including
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communicating with larger groups of people and various possible errors related to
losing or publicizing one’s own private key or losing other users’ public locks. The
possible errors were specific to each model and are shown in Table 3.2. In the in-
terest of simplicity, we did not include any email signing (or signature verification)
tasks.
Encryption tasks were completed using a Gmail account created especially for
the study and a Chrome browser extension based on Mailvelope [44]. We modi-
fied Mailvelope to remove its branding, change the labels to match our lock/key
metaphor, and reduce the interface to include only those features relevant to the
study tasks. Figure 3.1, right shows a screenshot of sending encrypted email with
our extension. As in Mailvelope, users of our extension compose an email and then
use an “Encrypt” button to select recipients. Upon receiving encrypted email, users
are prompted to enter their password to decrypt it (with the option to save the
password and avoid future prompting).
We created two versions of our extension, one for exchange and one for reg-
istration, taking care to make them as similar as possible. The only two visible
differences were (1) changing the “Generate lock/key pair” menu item and sub-
sequent screen (exchange model, Figure 3.1, left) to read “Register” (registration
model) and (2) a lock import screen (Figure 3.1, center) that was only relevant in
the exchange model.
We also provided participants with detailed instructions to help them use
the Chrome extension. By simplifying the interface, keeping it consistent, and
providing detailed instructions, we hoped participants’ reactions would better reflect
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Task # Exchange Model Registration Model
1 Generate public lock/private key pair Register public lock/private key pair
2 Exchange public locks with Alice N/A
3 Send encrypted email to Alice Send encrypted email to Alice
4 Decrypt received email from Alice Decrypt received email from Alice
5 Exchange public locks with Bob and
Carl
N/A
6 Send encrypted email to Bob and Carl Send encrypted email to Bob and Carl
7 Decrypt received email from Bob and
Carl
Decrypt received email from Bob and
Carl
8 Imagine sending encrypted email to 10
people.
Imagine sending encrypted email to 10
people.
9 Consider misconfigurations: Consider misconfigurations:
a. Lose Alice’s public lock N/A
b. Lose own private key b. Lose own private key
c. Publicize own private key c. Publicize own private key
Table 3.2: The encryption-related tasks completed by participants. The tasks dif-
fered slightly in the two models.
the inherent properties of each model rather than idiosyncrasies of a particular
interface.
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3.1.2 Description of security properties
We provided participants with short, non-technical descriptions of possible
attacks on each model.
Exchange model For the exchange model, we described a man-in-the-middle
attack in which the attacker could intercept or replace keys during the exchange
process: “For example, when you try to get the public lock from Dave, the attacker
secretly switches the public lock to his own. You think you have Dave’s public
lock, but in fact you have the attacker’s. As a result, the attacker can read your
email. The attacker will then use Dave’s public lock and send the encrypted email to
Dave, so that neither you nor Dave realize the email has been read.” We mentioned
that this type of threat doesn?t happen usually, because it requires the attacker to
have much power and resources to achieve this. We also showed participants the
illustration in Figure 3.2.
We decided not to include an option for key signing in our exchange model
both because we thought it would add unnecessary complexity to our explanations
and because it does not change the underlying requirement to trust some keys that
are manually exchanged.
Registration model For the registration model, we primarily described a man-
in-the-middle attack enabled by the key directory service: “When you try to send
encrypted emails to Dave, you think the database will return Dave’s public lock
to you. But in fact, it returns the attacker’s lock, so the attacker can read your
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Figure 3.2: Possible attacks on the exchange model
email. Therefore, you need to trust the email provider in this system.” We showed
participants the illustration in Figure 3.3.
In addition, we described two variations on the basic key directory approach:
the Confidentiality as a Service (CaaS) variation [51, 57], and an auditing model
similar to the one proposed by Google and CONIKS [16, 19]. Because these ap-
proaches are not currently in wide use the way the iMessage-analogous system is,
they were treated as secondary options. The auditing model was added (to the end
of the interview, to maintain consistency with earlier interviews) during recruiting,
and was therefore presented only to 24 participants.
The security of the CaaS variation was described as follows: “There is a third-
party service (not the email provider) as an intermediary. In this version, neither
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Figure 3.3: Possible attacks on the registration model
the third-party service nor your email provider can read your email themselves.
However, if your email provider and the third-party service collaborate, they can
both read your email. Therefore, you need to trust that the two services are not
collaborating.”
We described the auditing variation as follows: “The email provider stores all
users’ public locks, just like [the primary registration model]. But there are other
parties (auditors) who audit the email provider, to ensure it is giving out correct
public locks. These auditors may include other email providers, public interest
groups, and software on your devices. If the email provider gives you a public lock
that doesn’t belong to the recipient, or gives someone else the wrong public lock
for you, these auditors will notify you. You (or someone else) may use the wrong
lock temporarily (for an hour or a day) before you are notified. In this model, you
don’t need to trust your email provider, but you need to trust the auditors and/or
the software on your device. Because there are several auditors, even if one auditor
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does not alert you another one probably will.”
3.1.3 Participant feedback
Participants were asked questions after completing tasks for each model and
at the end of the process. After completing tasks and learning about security for
each model, participants were asked for their agreement (on a five-point Likert scale)
with the following statements:
• The task was difficult (for each task).
• The task was cumbersome (for each task).
• The system effectively protected my privacy.
The first two questions were repeated for each task in Table 3.2. Before an-
swering, participants were reminded that difficult tasks would require intellectual
effort or skill, while cumbersome tasks would be tedious or time-consuming. After
each Likert question, we asked participants to briefly explain their answer choice
(free response).
After completing all tasks and learning about all security models, participants
were asked several summative questions, including:
• Willingness to use each system, on a five-point Likert scale, and why.
• Willingness to recommend each system, on a five-point Likert scale, and why.
• What the participant liked and disliked about each system.
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3.1.4 Recruitment
We recruited participants 18 or older who were familiar with Gmail and
Chrome and who send and receive email at least 3 times per week. We placed
flyers around our university campus and the surrounding area, advertised via email
listservs for the university, and advertised on web platforms like Craigslist. All in-
terviews were conducted in person at our university campus; interviews were video
recorded with the explicit consent of participants. Participants were paid $20 for a
one-hour study and were reimbursed for parking if utilized. Our study protocol was
approved by the university’s Institutional Review Board.
Participants took part in the study in multiple batches between August 4,
2015 and Feb 5, 2016. For context, all of the participants engaged in the study well
after Edward Snowden revealed details of the National Security Agency’s broad
surveillance of digital communications [89], but before Apple publicly fought the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to not weaken the security of a locked and encrypted
iPhone [90]. We include this to note that average users’ views of security, privacy,
and here specifically, encryption are a moving target. Future events may continue
to shift public opinion on the importance of encrypted communications.
3.1.5 Data analysis
We used statistical analysis to investigate participants’ responses to the ex-
change and registration models. To account for our within-subjects design, we used
the standard technique of including random effects to group together responses
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from each participant. We used a cumulative-link (logit) mixed regression model
(CLMM), which fits ordinal dependent variables like the Likert scores we ana-
lyzed [91]. We included three covariates: whether the participant performed tasks
or learned about security first, whether the encryption model she was evaluating
was seen first or second, and the encryption model itself (exchange or registration).
This approach allows us to disentangle the ordering effects from the main effects
we are interested in. For each encryption model, we tested regression models with
and without the obvious potential interaction of encryption type with order of expo-
sure to that type, selecting the regression model with the lower Akaike information
criterion (AIC) [92].
Qualitative data was independently coded by two researchers using textual
microanalysis [93]. After several iterative rounds of developing a coding scheme,
the researchers each independently coded the full set of participant responses, with
multiple codes allowed per response. The researchers originally agreed on more than
94% of the codes, then discussed the instances of disagreement until consensus was
reached. Where appropriate, we report prevalence for the final qualitative codes to
provide context.
3.1.6 Limitations
Our methodology has several limitations. Our lab study participants had only
limited exposure to the different encryption models, and their opinions might change
after working with the models for a longer period or in the real world scenarios.
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Participants also only imagined their responses to misconfigurations, rather than
actually handling them. Nonetheless, we argue that first impressions like the ones
we collected influence whether people will try any tool for long enough to develop
more-informed opinions. It is well known that study participants may rate tools they
examine more favorably (acquiescence bias) [94], which may explain the high rate
of participants reporting they wanted to use or recommend each model. Because
we are primarily interested in comparing results between models, we believe this
has limited impact on our overall results; however, the absolute ratings should be
interpreted as a ceiling at best.
In order to provide participants with any understanding of the security prop-
erties of each model, we had to prime them with descriptions of possible attacks.
While this priming was unavoidable, we endeavored to keep the security descrip-
tions as neutral as possible so that priming would affect both models approximately
equally.
To avoid overwhelming participants, we evaluated a limited subset of possible
encryption models and possible tasks; in particular, we left out key signing as well
as any email signing or signature verification tasks. We did this because we believe
signing to be the most difficult aspect of cryptography for non-experts to understand
(see e.g., [1]), but including it might have provided a broader spectrum of user
opinions.
Our registration model, unlike, for example, iMessage, was not completely in-
visible to participants. We believe it was necessary to give participants something
to do other than just sending a normal email, in order to help them think through
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the tradeoffs involved. While presumably using a fully transparent variation would
only have increased the convenience gap between the two models, prior work indi-
cates that taking any steps at all increases feelings of security [4]. This may have
contributed to the small observed security gap between the two models, but we ar-
gue that a version with no intervention required would lead to underestimations of
security. Because we added the auditing model late, we were not able to get as much
feedback about it or to compare it quantitatively to the other models we examined.
In addition, because all participants encountered it last, their responses may reflect
some ordering effects. Nonetheless, we believe the qualitative data we collected does
provide interesting insights. Future work can examine all these alternatives in more
detail.
As with many lab studies, our participants do not perfectly reflect the general
population, which may limit the generalizability of our results.
3.2 Participants
A total of 96 people completed our pre-screening survey. We interviewed the
first 55 who qualified and scheduled appointments. Three participants were excluded
for failing to understand or respond coherently to any directions or questions.
Demographics for the 52 participants we consider are shown in our papers [58,
95]. Among them, 60% were male and 80% are between the ages of 18-34, which is
somewhat maler and younger than the general American population. Almost 85%
of participants reported “primarily” growing up in the United States, South Asia,
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or East Asia. 40% of participants reported jobs or majors in computing, math, or
engineering.
Despite this high rate of technical participants, most had little experience
with computer security. We measured security expertise using a slightly adapted
version of the scale developed by Camp et al. [96]. Higher scores indicate security
expertise; the maximum score is 5.5 and the minimum score is zero. Only two of
our participants scored 3 or higher.
Using a Kruskal-Wallis omnibus test, we found no significant differences among
our four conditions in age, gender, country of origin, or security expertise (p > 0.05).
3.3 Results and Analysis
We present participants’ reactions to the convenience and security of each
model, followed by a discussion of their overall preferences among the models.
3.3.1 Registration is more convenient
Unsurprisingly, our participants found the registration system considerably
more convenient, rating the exchange system as significantly more cumbersome and
more difficult. Figure 3.4 and Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the results of the CLMM
for cumbersome and difficult, respectively, for Task 8: imagining sending email to
a group of 10 people. In reading the CLMM tables, the exponent of the coefficient
indicates how much more or less likely participants were to move up one step on the
Likert scale of agreement.
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Figure 3.4: Participants’ ratings of difficulty and cumbersomeness (Task 8) as well
as whether participants thought the model protected their privacy. Labels indicate
which model participants evaluated along with whether they saw that model first
or second; e.g., “Exchange, First” indicates ratings for the exchange model among
those who saw it first, which includes ET and ES participants.
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For cumbersomeness the exchange model was associated with almost a 20x
increase in likelihood of indicating more agreement. The exchange model was also
about 5x more likely to be perceived as more difficult.
Factor Coef. Exp(coef) SE p-value
tasks first 0.010 1.010 0.589 0.986
second model -0.166 0.847 0.393 0.673
exchange 2.978 19.656 0.567 <0.001*
Table 3.3: Regression table for cumbersomeness, Task 8. The non-interaction model
was selected. Non-significant values are greyed out; significant values are indicated
with an asterisk.
Factor Coef. Exp(coef) SE p-value
tasks first -0.282 0.754 0.747 0.706
second model -0.726 0.484 0.460 0.115
exchange 1.674 5.333 0.520 0.001*
Table 3.4: Regression table for difficulty, Task 8. The non-interaction model was
selected. Non-significant values are greyed out; significant values are indicated with
an asterisk.
Participants’ comments generally supported this finding: that the exchange
model was dramatically more cumbersome and somewhat more difficult. Within the
exchange model, the most tedious task was manually exchanging locks and the most
commonly mentioned reason was waiting for a correspondent’s public lock. ES9 was
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concerned that the exchange model was “time-consuming, especially sending urgent
emails. I have no choice but to wait for” the correspondent’s public lock. RS5
agreed, saying “There are so many steps to exchange locks.” RS13 mentioned that
the cumbersomeness of exchanging locks was mainly related to initialization: “If
their locks are already there, it would not be cumbersome. But if I have to ask
them to send me locks person by person, it’s more cumbersome.” One participant
(ET10) worried it would be additionally cumbersome to use the exchange model on
a phone due to copying and pasting public keys.
Several participants expressed concern that users with low digital literacy
might have trouble with the exchange model or prefer the registration model. For
example, RS12 recommended the registration model “especially to people that don’t
know very well how to use a computer . . . old people, like my father.” ET2 agreed
that the registration model is “easy to teach others to use.”
While few participants considered any of the tasks very difficult, choosing a
mechanism for exchanging locks was considered the most difficult step by a few
participants, such as RS4, who mentioned having to “think about a safe way to
exchange public locks,” and RS10, who was concerned about making an exchange
error while multitasking.
Other concerns related to the general issue of convenience included scalability
and misconfiguration. As RT9 said, “When I send to more people, I have to be
very careful, especially when I choose to send them my public locks separately. I
need to control every step is correct.” ET13 said, “When I exchange locks with ten
people, I can send my lock, which is kind of easy. But I have to get ten replies
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for their locks. I can easily get lost. And if I exchange with 100 people, it’ll be a
nightmare.” A few participants were concerned about the difficulty of recovering
from misconfiguration, and ET10 was particularly worried that others’ mistakes
could cause additional hassle for her: “If other people lose their private keys and
send me new public locks, I will be overwhelmed.” RS12 agreed that “if accidents
or mistakes happen, it bothers both parties to do extra steps.”
The inconvenience of the exchange model could potentially be mitigated some-
what by posting the key publicly or semi-publicly (on a key server or Facebook pro-
file), rather than sending it individually to different recipients. About a third of our
participants chose this option: 34 used the primary email, 20 used the secondary
email, 10 used Facebook chat, five posted to the Facebook profile, and 13 used the
key server. (Some participants chose multiple methods during different tasks.) How-
ever, few of the participants who used the public or semi-public methods mentioned
the added convenience as a reason for their choice. RT12 said exchanging locks is
“not too cumbersome, it’s manageable through the lock server to exchange locks.”
On the other hand, a few participants chose the key server because they thought it
was more secure than other choices we provided.
3.3.2 The perceived security gap is small
We found that participants understood and thought critically about the secu-
rity properties we explained to them for each model. Surprisingly, they found the
exchange model to be only marginally more secure than the registration model, for
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a variety of reasons.
Exchange: Manual effort may lead to vulnerability Most participants be-
lieved the exchange model was most secure overall, with 48 (out of 52, 92.3%)
agreeing or strongly agreeing that this model protected their privacy. Nonetheless,
participants also expressed concern that managing key exchange themselves would
create vulnerabilities. More than half (27 out of 52) of participants were concerned
about the security of the medium used to exchange locks.—ET4 worried that ‘the
key server [could] be manipulated or compromised.” RT7 had several such concerns,
including that an attacker could break into her Facebook account to post an incorrect
public lock, or that public Wi-Fi in a coffee shop could be unsafe for transmitting
locks. Overall, she said, “There are too many exchanges between different people.
Exchanging [locks] to many people may go wrong.” Others, like RS5, worried that
their internet service provider could “sit between my recipient and me” and switch
locks to execute a man-in-the-middle attack. ET7 was one of several participants
who noted that “If I send the public locks and encrypted emails using the same
email provider, it’s not very secure.” RT9 thought the ability to choose from differ-
ent mechanisms to exchange locks provided added security, but worried that “people
may choose a particular way in real life. It’s their habits, so that attackers may an-
ticipate” their choices and take advantage of their known routine. ES10 asked his
recipients to send back his public lock, both through Facebook and via email, so he
could verify for himself that the received public locks were not altered.
Other participants were concerned about making a mistake during the ongoing
41
responsibility of managing keys. As ET10 put it, “Every time when I send or get
a public lock ... there is a probability, even though not high, that my privacy is
compromised. Then when I exchange public locks with many people, this probability
will increase exponentially.” RS12 worried that “I don’t know what I actually need
to do when I lose or publicize my private key. I am not confident about my answers.
Non-tech experts may make mistakes.”
Other participants mentioned that careless or compromised users could ruin
the security of a whole group. ES12 said, “If I send to Alice, and she decrypts and
goes away, then other people can see the email or even copy that email.” ET8 said
that “Within a company, if one person is hacked, then the whole company is hacked.
It’s hard to track the source, just like rotten food in the refrigerator.” ET4 agreed
that “There can be attacks on users with weak security, which may impair the whole
user system.”
Registration: Some concern but generally trusted As expected, many par-
ticipants were concerned about the need to trust email providers in the registration
model. As ES5 said, having the email provider store “all public locks ... is not very
comfortable.” Despite this, however, most participants (38 out of 52) trusted the
system protecting their privacy. Also, the CLMM results in Table 3.5 and Figure 3.4
indicate that the order in which the models were introduced played a significant role.
Participants who saw the registration model first were more comfortable with it: 9 of
26 who saw registration first strongly agreed that the model protected their privacy,
compared to only 3 of 26 who had already heard about the more-secure exchange
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model. None of the participants who saw registration first disagreed that the model
protected their privacy, while 3 did so after seeing the exchange model first.
Factor Coef. Exp(coef) SE p-value
tasks first -0.332 0.717 0.527 0.528
second model -1.684 0.186 0.699 0.016*
exchange -0.288 0.750 0.670 0.668
second model :: exchange 2.818 16.740 1.124 0.012*
Table 3.5: Regression table for privacy. The interaction model was selected. Non-
significant values are greyed out; significant values are indicated with an asterisk.
This general confidence in the registration model reflects many participants’
belief that even though email providers could compromise the security of the primary
registration model, they would be unlikely to. Ten participants mentioned that
they trust their own email provider (presumably if they didn’t they would switch
services). ET11 mentioned that his email provider “knows me, I have my name
there,” and ET12 said that “All public locks are stored in a database, and I trust
the database. This database provides extra security.” ET13 provided a slightly
different view: that some email providers are untrustworthy in well-known ways.
“Everyone knows the Gmail potential vulnerabilities. And some people who are
particularly hiding some information from the U.S. government, they will choose
Yandex email from Russia, because they’d rather be intercepted by the Russian
government, instead of the U.S. government. . . . If you are an activist in US, and
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you don’t want the U.S. government to know what you are up to, so I will choose
some email services I feel comfortable with.”
Several (7 participants) were specific about which kind of providers they would
trust: RT8 would trust “certain big companies, not small companies,” because big
companies must protect their reputations. RT10 felt similarly, with an important
caveat, mentioning that big companies like “Google and Yahoo! don’t do such
things [violate users’ privacy] usually, unless the government forces them to do so.
In general, it’s secure.” ET11 would choose an email provider with many users since
“the more people using it, the more reliable.” RT2, on the other hand, preferred
to trust institutions like universities that “own their own email server” to better
protect her privacy.
Also contributing to the general comfort level with the registration model is
that participants do not believe most or any of their communication requires high
security. RT4 said “encryption is not necessary for me,” and RS8 agreed, saying “If
I have some private information, I won’t put it on the Internet.”
CaaS and auditing: Some additional perceived security for registration
Out of all 52 participants, twenty-two participants preferred the CaaS variation to
the primary registration model, and 12 preferred the primary model to CaaS; the
rest rated the two variations the same. The most popular explanation for preferring
CaaS was a belief that different companies would not collude. RS7 said that the
two parties would not collude because they do not “even trust each other.” ES12
was cautiously positive, saying “This separation makes me feel good. However, [the
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two parties] still can possibly collaborate.” Relatedly, ES8 suggested that the CaaS
approach was more secure because “If one party is screwed up, you have another
one to protect [your email]. You are still safe.” These comments have implications
for the auditing model as well; the belief that different parties are unlikely to collude
and recognition that distributing trust spreads out possible points of failure would
also point to more trust in the auditing model.
On the other hand, four users thought the primary registration model was
more secure than the CaaS variation because adding more intermediate systems
and providers reduces overall security. RS1, for example, said that “involving more
systems may complicate the system, so it is less trustful.” A few users said that the
possibility of collaboration invalidates the entire model: for example, ES13 said “I
don’t trust that much the whole system. I am afraid they may collaborate.” Two
participants (ET4, RS13) were afraid that in CaaS the two parties might collaborate
for a sufficiently large gain. For example, RS13 said “They will not collaborate for
one or two person’s email, but for many, a group of people.”
Other participants were concerned about whether the third party in CaaS was
trustworthy. ET11 worried that “the third party service is not verified,” and RT9
said his opinion “depends on who the two entities are. If the two companies are
big names, like Gmail and Facebook, it seems more secure. Also if they do different
types of services [from each other], it’s more secure.”
The 24 participants who were briefly exposed to the auditing variation gave
generally positive feedback. ES9 was happy that “somebody is supervising” lock
distribution and watching for problems, and ET13 said “Obviously it’s extra secure.
45
Other parties are verifying it, like an anti-virus system telling me if something
goes wrong.” ET8 appreciated that “if something goes wrong, I will be notified.”
The presence of many auditors reassured participants that collusion was unlikely;
for example, RT10 commented that “it’s less likely that all auditors [would] do
something bad,” and RS12 appreciated that “there are many auditors who can
notify me.”
Several participants, however, were concerned about the reliability of the au-
ditors: RS9 said, “I want to know who these auditors are, . . . their reputations, and
whether they are truly independent.” Similarly, RT13 said, “Am I able to choose
auditors? This is a big question. The principle is good . . . but I want to know who
they are and how to choose them, because I need to trust them.” One user (ET10)
was concerned that auditors from competing companies might have incentives to lie
about each others’ behavior, making it hard to know who to trust. According to
ET11, involving more parties reduced the overall trustworthiness: “Putting trust to
only one party is better.”
Ten participants expressed concern about the time lag for notification, noting
that “a lot emails have already been sent” with even an hour’s delay (ES10). RT11
said “It should be immediate notification. Even an hour is too late. . . . Something
bad has already happened.” Others, however, were more pragmatic: “Immediate
notification is ideal, but I don’t expect immediateness in reality” (RT9). ET13 said
the time lag “is a vulnerability. It depends on how often I send encrypted emails. If
I use it very often, then it’s vulnerable.” Similarly, RT12 pointed out that “If I don’t
send the email, it doesn’t matter, but in this case, I don’t receive the wrong locks.
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. . . Notification happens after the fact that I already received the wrong lock.”
3.3.3 Overall comparison between systems
After exposing them to both models, we asked participants whether they would
use or recommend the exchange model, the primary registration model, or the CaaS
registration model. Figure 3.5 shows that the exchange model and CaaS variation
were slightly preferred to the primary registration model. The number of partic-
ipants who agreed or strongly agreed to use or recommend each model were 27,
23, and 28 (use) and 29, 21, and 28 (recommend). The CLMM results (Tables 3.6
and 3.7), which take the exchange model as a baseline, show no significant differ-
ence between exchange and either variation of registration for would-use, but do
show that the primary registration was recommended less frequently than the ex-
change model. The 95% confidence intervals for each model indicate no significant
differences between the primary and CaaS registration models in either case.
The regression models also indicate that participants who completed the en-
cryption tasks before hearing about security properties were less likely to use or
recommend any model than those who heard about security properties first. We hy-
pothesize that participants who used the encryption extension before hearing about
security anchored on the inconvenience of the tool rather than its privacy benefits.
While this does not provide useful insight about comparing the different systems, it
does underline the need for careful consideration about how new encryption tools
are presented to the public.
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Factor Coef. Exp(coef) SE p-value
tasks first -0.606 0.546 0.308 0.049*
second model -0.026 0. 975 0.291 0.930
registration (primary) -0.376 0.687 0.358 0.294
registration (CaaS) -0.077 0.926 0.360 0.823
Table 3.6: Regression table for whether participants would use each model. The
non-interaction model was selected. Exchange is the base case for model type.
Only whether participants completed tasks first or heard about security first was
significant.
Factor Coef. Exp(coef) SE p-value
tasks first -0.678 0.508 0.303 0.025*
second model -0.198 0.820 0.291 0.496
registration (primary) -0.915 0.401 0.368 0.013*
registration (CaaS) -0.490 0.613 0.366 0.180
Table 3.7: Regression table for whether participants would recommend each model
to others. The non-interaction model was selected. Exchange is the base case for
model type. Primary registration is significant (less recommended vs. exchange),
while CaaS is not significantly different from exchange. Participants who completed
the encryption tasks before hearing about security properties were signficantly less
likely to recommend any model.
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Figure 3.5: Participants’ ratings of whether they would use or recommend each
model.
We asked participants why they would or would not use each system, and cate-
gorized each participant’s self-reported most important reason as related to security,
usability, or both. (Details of participants’ usability and security opinions for each
system were discussed in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 respectively.) For participants
who would not use a system, we also included having no need for encryption as a
separate category. Figure 3.6 shows the results. Some participants gave more than
one answer; a few did not give meaningful responses.
Unsurprisingly, the perception of better security attracted participants to the
exchange model, while poor usability drove them away. Participants’ reactions to
the two registration models were more complicated. In both cases, insufficient secu-
rity was the most common reason for rejecting the systems; however, participants
who said they would use the primary registration model were evenly split between
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Figure 3.6: The most significant reason why participants would and would not
use each model. We note here that while the number of participants who would
use each system is similar, their reasoning varies. For example, prospective users
of the exchange model uniformly cite security, while prospective users of the two
registration models cite a mixture of security and usability.
whether its usability or its security was more important. Participants who said they
would use the CaaS model largely but not uniformly cited its security properties.
Participants who said they would use the exchange model generally described
using it for high-security information only, or only at a small scale. ES6 exemplified
this trend, saying the exchange model is “the safest one. I want to use it in small
scale, like one or two people, ... like private and personal things. But I don’t want to
use it every day.” RS9 felt similarly: “I think this system is more effective with fewer
people, maybe under ten. I would use it when I send my credit card information to
my Mom, instead of QQ or Wechat [two instant messaging services].” ES10 said he
would use the exchange model for client projects, which should be kept secret until
they are finished. Among the 27 participants who agreed they would want to use
the exchange model, none mentioned using it with a large group; 16 said they would
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use it for very private information while only one said she would use it for general
or everyday emails.
In contrast, participants who said they would use either variation of the reg-
istration model mentioned “contacting a large number of customers” for payroll or
financial information (ET6) as well as “party and meeting announcements” (ET9,
RS13). RT8 said she would use the registration model for information that was
“overall private, but would not be a disaster if disclosed, e.g., my daughter is sick.”
ES7, a teacher, said she would use the exchange model only for “extremely sensitive
information, such as SSNs,” while she would use the registration model to send “lo-
cation information or grade information.” In total, 15 participants who wanted to
use either variation of the registration model mentioned general email or large-scale
communications.
These results suggest that although most participants said they would use both
systems at least sometimes, quite a few wanted encryption only in specific circum-
stances. Between the exchange and registration models, however, our participants
found the registration model useful in a broader variety of circumstances.
Using vs. recommending As expected, most participants (44) who said they
would use a system also said they would recommend it to others, and vice versa,
but a few gave interesting reasons for answering differently. ET4 said he would not
use the exchange model because it was too cumbersome, but would recommend it to
others who have stronger privacy requirements. Similarly, RT4 said that “encryption
is not necessary for me,” but recommended the CaaS variation of the registration
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model because it is “easier to use [than the exchange model] and more secure than
the vanilla [primary] registration system.”
Registration vs. no encryption We did not explicitly ask participants to com-
pare these encryption models to unencrypted email. However, 5 participants who
had concerns about the security of the registration model (total 14 rated less than
4) also mentioned that it does provide a valuable security improvement over unen-
crypted email. ET7 said “The email is not raw, which is another layer of security.
... Doing encryption gives me a security sense that I lock my door myself.” RT12,
explaining why he would use the primary registration model, noted that “I have to
trust the email provider, which is problematic, but . . . it’s better than raw email.”
In line with findings from prior work [4], for some participants the process of
taking any manual steps (such as generating a key pair in either model) increased
their confidence that protection was occurring; for example, RS6 said “extra steps
give me a security sense.”
Auditing model We asked participants who heard about the auditing model
whether they would use it; overall, it proved popular. Of the 24 participants who
were introduced to the auditing model, 15 said they would like to use it. Of these,
10 preferred it to any other model discussed. For example, ES11 said, “It’s best
among all systems mentioned in the experiment, because somebody else is policing
them, just like watchdogs. If someone is reading your email, they might be caught.”
RT8 preferred the auditing model to any other option because “unlike the other
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models . . . instead of using [the attacker’s] public lock blindly, I will get the update,
‘Oh, that’s the wrong public lock, you should not use this.’”
Four found the auditing model superior to the other registration models, but
preferred the exchange model in at least some circumstances. RS10 said he would
send personal information including banking data using the auditing model, but
“if I worked in a government department, I would still use the exchange model.”
RT12 said the audit model is “slightly better than [the primary] registration model
. . . because in [the primary registration] model I don’t know if wrong locks happened.
But overall, the lock exchange system has extra steps, extra layers of security, so
I like it best among all the systems.” Several of these 15 participants noted the
possible time lag in notification as an important disadvantage, but were willing to use
the model anyway. This generally positive reaction, combined with the preference
to split risk among different parties in the CaaS model, suggests that the auditing
model has strong potential to meet with user approval.
Eight participants said they would not use the auditing model (one was un-
sure). One of these (RS11) preferred it to all other models but believed he had no
need to encrypt his email, and three found it worse than the exchange model. Four
said it was worst among all models discussed, either because they did not trust the
auditors or because the time lag was too great.
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3.3.4 Participant understanding
Despite receiving only a short introduction to each encryption system, most of
our participants demonstrated thoughtful understanding of key concepts for each,
suggesting that they provided credible opinions throughout the experiment.
Handling misconfiguration We asked participants to consider how they would
handle various possible misconfigurations in each model. Our primary goal was to
prompt them to consider usability issues related to longer-term key maintenance,
but this section of the interviews also offered a chance to evaluate participants’
understanding of the different security models. Most participants were capable of
reasoning correctly about these error scenarios.
Participants were presented with five different misconfiguration scenarios across
the two models (see Table 3.2). Thirty-nine of 52 participants (75%) responded to
all five scenarios with a straightforwardly correct answer, such as asking Alice to
resend a lost public key (task 9a, exchange) or generating a new lock-key pair and
redistributing the lock to all correspondents (task 9b, exchange). Seven additional
participants (13.5%) provided such answers to at least three of the scenarios. One
participant (RS13) mentioned recovering keys from a backup (such as a USB drive)
rather than generating a new key pair.
We note several interesting misconceptions among those participants who got
at least one scenario wrong. Four participants responding to task 9c (accidentally
publicizing their own private key, in either model) suggested changing their password
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within the encryption extension; the password unlocks access to the private key, but
a new password would not help if the key has already been exposed. Another
participant (RS7) suggested for 9c that “I will send my email to a third person I
trust, and ask that person to encrypt the email for me and send to my recipients.
Similarly, he will decrypt the [response] email for me and forward it to me.” This
shows interesting security thinking but misses the potential for the message to be
captured during the first step. Other common answers included getting tech support
from the company that developed the encryption extension1 and simply “I don’t
know.”
Overall, participants were largely able to engage with these misconfiguration
scenarios, demonstrating working understanding of the encryption tools; remaining
misconceptions highlight areas in which more education, clearer directions in the
tools, and more frequent use of encryption may be helpful.
Thinking about security Our participants made several thoughtful points about
encryption, security, and privacy that apply across models. ES4 mentioned that an
extra benefit (of any encryption model) is a reduction in targeted ads: The “email
provider can collect data through my emails, and then present ads. . . . I don’t want
that. [Using this tool] the ads will not appear.”
ES10 expressed concern that an email encryption provider (in either model)
might collect your private key, especially if you are using Apple email on an Apple
1While completely reasonable in practice, this answer does not demonstrate understanding of
the encryption model’s security properties and so was not counted as “correct” for this purpose.
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device or Google email in Chrome, etc. One participant (RS9) was concerned about
using public computers. This is potentially a problem for both encryption models,
which assume the private key is securely stored on the user’s local device. She
was also concerned that the act of sending a lock might itself catch the interest of
attackers; another participant (RS11) liked the sense of security provided by both
encryption models but thought it might seem paranoid to worry about others reading
his emails. Similar concerns were raised in GAW et al. [18]. ES12 expressed concern
that the centralized nature of the registration model would provide a juicier target
for an attacker than many individuals participating in the exchange model. ET10
worried that encryption would bypass an email provider’s virus-detection system.
Several (11) participants liked that the exchange model allowed them to ex-
plicitly control who would be able to send them encrypted email. ES2 said he would
“know the person whom I sent the public locks to,” and RT3 liked that “who can
send me encrypted emails [is] controlled by myself.” RS13 said that “if I communi-
cate with a group of people, it’s easy to kick someone out of the group.” A similar
level of control can be implemented in a registration model; our findings suggest
this is a feature at least some users value.
Although many participants understood and reasoned effectively about the
security properties we presented, some retained incorrect mental models that have
implications for the ongoing design of encryption systems. RS1 incorrectly believed
that since he could not understand an encrypted message since it looked completely
random, no one else (including his email provider) would be able to either. Others
were concerned about keeping their public locks secret in the exchange model; three
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split their locks across different channels in an effort to be more secure. For example,
RS2 sent half of his public lock through the secondary email account and posted
the other half on the key server. RT7 thought it would be insecure to store public
locks: “After I send my lock to other people, others may not delete my public lock.
. . . I may also forget to do so after I import others’ locks. The fewer people know
my public lock, the safer.” Relatedly, ES13 worried that in the auditing model, the
auditors “are scanning my lock. It sounds like more people are watching me besides
the email provider, and I don’t feel good.”
Several participants also had concerns and misconceptions about how keys are
managed across multiple devices, regardless of model. System designers may want
to provide help or information on these points.
Evaluating tradeoffs In deciding which system(s) they preferred, participants
explicitly and deliberately made tradeoffs among their security and usability fea-
tures. For example, ES13 said he would use the exchange model because “Exchang-
ing locks makes it more private for me,” despite the fact that “it takes time to
exchange locks.” ES10 also preferred the exchange model: “Having something bet-
ter than baseline is one approach. But if I compare to perfect security I am trying
to get, it’s another approach. . . . When you want to use it, you really want it to be
very well protected.”
On the other hand, RT13, who said he would not use the exchange model,
commented that “The negotiating process maybe gives me safer feelings, more pro-
tection. But on the other hand . . . the disadvantage is it is time consuming, cum-
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bersome, tedious, more complicated, and this is the price I have to pay for more
protection.”
RS7 said she would use the primary registration model because it is “easy
to use, and I think most of us trust our email provider,” although she understood
that “there are some possible threats.” ET8, in contrast, would not use the primary
registration model because “[Although] it’s easy to send encrypted emails, especially
to many people. But security concern is the reason I don’t want to use it.” According
to ES12, the exchange model “is more straightforward. Only I and the other person
[recipient] get involved in the communication, and no others.” These comments
and others demonstrate that participants understood pros and cons of the different
models and thought carefully about how to balance them.
3.4 Conclusion
In this work, we conducted a 52-person lab study to understand how general
users balance the usability and security tradeoffs for different key management mod-
els in end-to-end encryption. We found that users could understand at least some
high-level security properties and could coherently trade these properties off against
factors like convenience. We found that while participants recognized that the ex-
change model could provide better overall privacy, they also recognized its potential
for self-defeating mistakes. Similarly, our participants acknowledged potential se-
curity problems in the registration model, but found it “good enough” for many
everyday purposes, especially when offered the option to audit the system and/or
split trust among several parties. Therefore, trying to convince average users to
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exclusively use more complicated schemes, when they often don’t see a need for the
added protection, may instead keep them away from using any encryption at all,
given that many users already believe encryption is either too much work or un-
necessary for their personal communications. Rather than spreading undue alarm
about the risks of key-directory based models, or forcing users into only exchange
models, we recommend that policymakers and designers present tradeoffs clearly
and encourage adoption of usable but imperfect security for the many scenarios
where it may be appropriate.
59
Chapter 4: User Tradeoffs for Search in Encrypted Communication
End-to-end message encryption is the only way to fully protect message pri-
vacy. However, searching over end-to-end encrypted messages is complicated. Sev-
eral popular communication tools (e.g., WhatsApp, iMessage) circumvent this in-
convenience by storing the search index locally on the devices. Another approach,
called searchable encryption, allows users to search encrypted messages without stor-
ing the search index locally. Although popular in academic research, this approach
has not been deployed in communication tools. These approaches have inherent
tradeoffs between usability and security properties, yet little is known about how
general users value these tradeoffs. In this part of work, we systematize these trade-
offs in order to identify key feature differences. We use these differences as the
basis for a choice-based conjoint analysis experiment (n=160), in which participants
make a series of choices between email services with competing features. The re-
sults allow us to quantify the relative importance of each feature. We find that
users indicate high importance for increasing privacy and minimizing local storage
requirements. While privacy is more important overall, local storage is more impor-
tant than adding additional marginal privacy after an initial improvement. These
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results suggest the potential for searchable encryption to fill an important niche in
meeting users’ communication needs.
4.1 Design Space for Search in Encrypted Communication
In this section we characterize security and usability tradeoffs for searching
encrypted communications.
We first consider a cloud index (CI), defined as follows. When a new message
arrives at the user’s device, it is decrypted locally and then tokenized. Using a
secret tokenization key stored on the local device, these tokens are encrypted, and
a mapping between tokens and the associated message identifier is uploaded to the
cloud-based search index. To search for messages containing a keyword w, the user’s
device uses the tokenization key to generate an encrypted token for w and sends it
to the server. The server looks this token up in an index and returns all associated
message identifiers. This approach is based on searchable encryption techniques
such as those described by Stefanov et al. and Bost [27,28].
We contrast this approach with a local index (LI). When a new message
arrives, it is decrypted locally, and its contents are added to an unencrypted search
index stored on the local device. All queries are handled locally, so no information
about the index or queries is provided to the communications service. This is the
approach used by WhatsApp and iMessage.
As a basis of comparison, we also include two control approaches: no end-to-
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end encryption (None) (as in most popular email services today) and end-to-end
encryption without search (NoSearch) (as in services like Mailvelope [44]).
We do not include ORAM-based [97] schemes, as they are not yet sufficiently
practical in terms of performance.
We compare our four chosen approaches on the following metrics:
• Expressiveness: The types of search expressions supported by each solution.
• Performance: The cost of searching and of updating the search index in server
storage, client storage, bandwidth consumption, and time.
• Portability: How well each solution can be scaled to multiple devices, including
initializing a new device and routinely switching devices.
• Security: Threat models each solution can and cannot defend against.
4.1.1 Expressiveness
In this section, we consider the types of search expressions each approach can
support. We surveyed current mainstream email and instant messaging systems,
including Gmail, Outlook, Apple Mail, Yahoo Mail, WhatsApp, and iMessage, to
create the following list of currently supported and widely used search techniques:
• Exact single word. Users search for one word, and get back messages contain-
ing exactly that word.
• Multiple-word boolean. The search expression contains more than one key-
word. By default these are typically combined via AND, but OR and NOT
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None NoSearch CI LI
Expressiveness
Exact single word X — X X
Multi-word boolean X — X X
Exact string X — — X
Partial word X — — X
Aux. expressions:
Sender/recipient X X X X
Subject line X — X X
Date X X X X
Label or folder X — X X
Performance
Server storage O(N) — O(N) 0
Client storage 0 — O(WlogD) O(N)
Bandwidth Q+ L — Q+ L+ U 0
Latency low — low low
Table 4.1: Supported search expressions and performance for different search ap-
proaches. For expressions, Xindicates that an expression type is supported; expres-
sion types that cannot be effectively supported are indicated with “—”. We note
that current industry products do not necessarily support all types of expressions;
this analysis is based on capabilities rather than implemented products. For perfor-
mance, Q, L and U mean the size of query content, returned list of identified items,
and update information, respectively.
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are also potential options.
• Exact string. A query that returns all messages that contain the exact multi-
word string, in order. This is often implemented as a query string enclosed in
quotation marks.
• Partial word. The system returns any messages containing words that are
superstrings of the provided keyword.
• Auxiliary expressions. These expressions, which are sometimes referred to
as advanced search operators, allow the user to specify that specific keyword
should be found in a specific field, such as the sender or subject line; to specify
a date range within which to search; or to specify a label or folder within which
to search.
Our results are summarized in Table 4.1. In the None approach, the service
has access to all plaintext messages and therefore can support all types of search
expressions. In contrast, in the NoSearch approach the server cannot search over
encrypted messages at all, so only searches based on the sender/recipient and the
date are available. The date can always be observed by the communications service,
and the sender and recipient cannot be easily encrypted if the message is to be
correctly delivered.1 If subjects and labels/folders are also encrypted, they cannot
be searched over, although we observe that current tools, such as Mailvelope, do
not encrypt subjects and labels/folders and therefore can be searched.
1There are some email services that provide identity anonymity, e.g. TorGuard (https://
torguard.net/anonymous-email.php), but this consideration is out of scope for this paper.
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None NoSearch CI LI
Basic Password Basic Password
Portability
Old msg Yes No No Yes No Yes
Index Shared — Own Shared Own Inherited
Security
Keyword All None More P Less P
Message All None More P Less P
Table 4.2: Portability and security for variations of the CI and LI approaches.
For portability, the first row concerns whether old messages (from before device
activation) can be read and searched on new devices. The second row concerns
how indexes are constructed — independently per device (“own”), “shared” across
devices, or “inherited” from another device. For security, the extent to which search
keywords and messages is indicated (on a relative scale, in order) as “All”, “More”,
“Less”, and “None.” P means security depends on the password strength.
In the LI case, all information is obtained from plaintext emails and stored on
the local device; as such, all the expressions we consider are supported. The nature
of the CI approach inherently allows single keywords and their boolean combina-
tions; however, boolean combinations leak more information about the user’s search
patterns and therefore their message contents [98]. As the number of keywords
involved in these combinations increases, search performance in the CI approach
degrades. Recent research measuring email usage patterns, however, suggests that
the average number of keywords per email search query is only about 1.5, suggest-
ing that the common case for multi-word boolean searching is reasonable for CI
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systems. Searchable encryption could support exact multi-word strings by indexing
n-grams of various lengths; however, as this would degrade performance even more
quickly, and strings of length greater than two or three words would quickly become
impractical, we consider it unsupported.
We next consider whether CI can support arbitrary partial keywords. There
are some partial solutions, but those proposed in [99–101] did not support updates,
and both [102] and [103] adopted ORAM schemes. Some partial keyword search
is possible if word stemming (e.g., Porter Stemmer 2) is applied before message
indexing, and the keyword is exactly the anticipated stem. Overall, we consider this
unsupported.
As to auxiliary expressions, CI can support sender/recipient and date expres-
sions for the same reasons that NoSearch can, described above. If subject lines and
labels/folders are encrypted, they can be tokenized and searched just like message
contents, so we say that these expressions are feasible. We distinguish this from the
None case, where these items can be either encrypted or searched, but not both.3
4.1.2 Performance
We next consider performance metrics with which to evaluate each search
solution. In particular, we consider the cloud and local storage space required,
2https://tartarus.org/martin/PorterStemmer/
3We note that email systems may not be able to create and populate labels or folders automat-
ically because they cannot read email contents.
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bandwidth consumption in search and update operations, and latency in search and
update operations. The results are summarized in Table 4.1.
The notation used in this section is as follows: N denotes the total number
of keyword/message pairs, W is the number of unique keywords, and D is the
total number of encrypted messages. We use the performance reported in [28] as a
reference example for a searchable encryption scheme, because it provides a good
balance between performance and other metrics.
First we consider server and local storage requirements. For NoSearch, there
is no index, and for None, the index is stored entirely in the cloud and is approxi-
mately proportional to N , adjusted for some data compression. For LI, the index
is stored entirely locally, and is again roughly proportional to N , adjusted for data
compression. For CI, the situation is more complex. Some local storage is re-
quired, roughly proportional to W logD, but the bulk of storage is in the cloud.
This storage is proportional to N , but larger than the storage required for None
because of encryption-scheme overhead. In the Bost scheme, for example, each
keyword/message pair requires 32B of cloud storage [28].
We next consider bandwidth consumed during search queries and updates.
Trivially, NoSearch consumes no bandwidth; because LI is purely local it similarly
consumes none. None consumes bandwidth equal to submitting the query content
and returning the list of identified items. CI operates similarly, but with additional
overhead caused by the encryption scheme. CI also requires the client to send update
information in order to index a new message. Bost’s scheme requires 16B per input
token and 32B per output keyword/message pair during search, along with 32B per
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newly indexed keyword/message pair.
Finally, we consider latency. CI is more time consuming, both in search and
in updates, than the LI and None approaches, because it requires additional com-
putation. However, overall the latency performance of such schemes has become
very fast. Microbenchmarks reported in [28] demonstrate that searching among 140
million keyword/message pairs, with 10 results returned, requires only 24 µs. This
latency will increase as the number of keyword/message pairs — and in particular,
the number of unique keywords — increases. Updates, upon receiving and index-
ing a new encrypted message, can generally occur in the background rather than
while the end user is waiting; Bost reports an update throughput of around 4,300
keyword/message pairs per second.
4.1.3 Portability
Previous studies have shown that the number of devices people use to access
their email has grown over the past few years [20, 104]. Therefore, it is important
to consider how each solution can be scaled to more than one device.
None solutions, of course, are trivially portable. The portability of NoSearch,
CI and LI solutions depends primarily on the underlying key management model, as
shown in Table 4.2. In the basic model, as adopted by Mailvelope [44], the key pair
is generated locally and the key is not shared with other devices. As such, when
a new device is added to the ensemble, it does not have access to messages that
were not encrypted for the new device’s key. For both CI and LI, this means that
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devices cannot read or search messages from before device activation. Each device
requires its own separate encrypted index, and upon activation the new device begins
building its index from scratch.
An alternative model applies a password-protected approach to share keys. We
refer to this as the password-protected variation. This model allows users to decrypt
old messages on new devices by retrieving corresponding keys from the cloud, and
it has been adopted by several existing products or research prototypes, such as
Confidante [60], ProtonMail [105], and Threema [106]. For CI, sharing a password-
protected key allows new devices to read and search all old messages, and allows
different devices to share one index in the cloud. In the password-protected LI, a
new device can access old messages and can inherit an existing index and update it
as new messages are received.
There may be other portability solutions as well, but we consider these basic
and password-protected approaches as exemplars for our analysis.
4.1.4 Security
This section briefly describes the threat model each solution can defend against,
as well as its weaknesses. We focus on the ability of service providers (e.g., email
companies) to learn their users’ message contents and search queries. We do not
address interception by third parties or endpoint compromise, as these are for the
most part orthogonal to the implementation of search. We assume a semi-honest
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scenario, where the provider is curious but does not deviate from protocols.
We first consider our two controls, None and NoSearch. In None solutions,
since all messages are in plaintext, the provider will learn all message contents as
well as all of a user’s search queries. This is how most email services currently
work (e.g., Gmail [107]). We regard this solution as the lower bound for security.
In NoSearch solutions, only the user can read messages sent to her, and all other
parties, including the provider, cannot. There are no search queries, so the provider
cannot learn them. We consider this solution the upper bound for security in our
evaluation.
Table 4.2 shows some security features for CI and LI. Many different CI so-
lutions provide more security than None, but less than NoSearch. Generally, the
content of search queries is concealed but the search pattern, access pattern, and
size pattern are revealed to the provider (for detailed definitions, we refer readers
to [24]). Further, many proposed CI approaches achieve forward privacy, meaning
that when a user searches for a keyword, if a later message containing the same
keyword is added, the server cannot connect it to the prior search.
In the past few years, researchers have investigated how to exploit the informa-
tion leaked by these schemes. CI solutions built from Bloom filters (e.g., [108,109])
are potentially vulnerable to message recovery via leaked information [110]. There
are also many proposed attacks for recovering search keywords, the details of which
differ based on assumptions about the providers’ abilities as well as about the com-
position and distribution of messages and search keywords. For example, providers
who can send encrypted messages to the client, potentially from a spoofed address,
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can learn whether a user is searching within a set of candidate keywords [111].
For LI solutions, leaked information is minimal, as all searches are performed
locally. However, eliminating leakage entirely has been proven impossible [112];
for example, the provider may observe patterns in which old messages are requested
from the server (presumably after a local search has completed). Overall, we consider
LI to be stronger than CI but not precisely as secure as NoSearch.
If we consider the special case of password-protected key and/or index material
discussed in Section 4.1.3 above, the security of both CI and LI reduces to the
strength of the user’s password.
4.2 Email Preference Study
In the previous section, we identified several key tradeoffs related to search
in encrypted communication systems. Choosing among these tradeoffs, however,
requires understanding how users balance and prioritize different features. As a
first step toward understanding this, we conducted a choice-based conjoint analysis
study focused on email. In conjoint analysis, participants are presented with a
set of product profiles that vary in several dimensions. By choosing among them,
participants reveal their relative preferences among the various features [113, 114].
In this study, we asked participants to choose among email services with different
features drawn from the tradeoff analysis presented in Section 4.1. In this section,
we describe the features we selected, then detail the design of our study and our
analysis approach.
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4.2.1 Features and options
Features Feature Descriptions Options




When you search emails, can you search using




When you search emails, can you search with a partial
word instead of a complete word, e.g., “amaz” vs “amazon”
Yes
No
Storage on your device
How much local storage the service will
use (on your computer or phone)
Will use 5MB on your device, equivalent to about 2-3 HD photos
Will use 500MB on your device, equivalent to about 200 HD photos or 20 mobile apps
Syncing old email
to a new device
After using the email service on one device
(a phone or laptop) for several months, you
buy a new device. You set up the email service
on your new device. Can you read and search
old emails on your new device?
Yes – read and search all email using the new device both before and
after its activation.
No – read and search only email after you configured the
new device. You can’t read and search old emails on your new device.
Privacy
What can your email service learn about
your email and email search queries?
Standard privacy: Your email service can access the contents of all email and
email search queries. This is how most email services currently work (Gmail,
Yahoo! mail, Outlook, etc.)
Extra privacy: Your email service can access the contents of certain
emails and email search queries, but not all. The service can choose specific
topics of high interest to learn about.
Maximum privacy: Your email service cannot access the contents of
any emails or email search queries.
Table 4.3: Features and options used in our conjoint analysis experiment. We
selected six features, with two to three possible options for each.
For the rest of the paper, we define feature as a general property of a choice
profile — for example, price or security posture — and we define option as one of
various settings a given feature can take. For example, the price feature has options
of $0.00 and $1.99.
Based on the tradeoffs identified in Section 4.1, we identified six features to
examine: price, multi-word email search, partial-word email search, local (device)
storage, portability of old messages to a new device, and privacy. Each feature has
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two or three possible options. All features and options are listed in Table 4.3.
The first feature we include is price; this is included because it is familiar to
participants when thinking about value tradeoffs, and because it allows us to express
the resulting valuations for different features in dollars. We chose to use a monthly
fee to make the price a bit more meaningful for users on an ongoing basis. To set the
price, we searched “secure email” in both Apple Store and Google Play, and looked
at the top 50 returned apps; more than 90% were priced at $1.99 or lower, and the
majority are free. Therefore, we set two options for the price feature: $0.00 and
$1.99. We note that setting the best possible price is not critical, as our main goal is
to choose something differentiable enough to matter to users, but not so expensive
that it overwhelms other features.
We chose two expressiveness features: multi-word search and partial-word
search. These features are used relatively often for email search [22, 80], and they
vary between the two main search solutions we consider. (For simplicity, we pre-
sented users with only “multi-word search” and did not differentiate between boolean
and exact string matching.) We do not include single keyword, or auxiliary expres-
sions that consider the sender/receiver or date, as they are supported by both LI
and CI. More complex auxiliary expressions are also rarely used [21]. In the con-
joint analysis, each expressiveness feature has two options: “yes” (available) or “no”
(unavailable).
As discussed in Section 4.1.2, the most notable performance difference among
approaches we consider is related to storage on the local device. The storage re-
quired, of course, depends on how many keyword-email pairs a particular user gen-
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erates, and will increase over time as more messages are added. For simplicity,
however, we set two possible options for the storage feature: 5MB of local storage
(low storage) and 500MB of local storage (high storage). The 5MB figure repre-
sents CI and is adapted from Bost, reflecting 14 million keyword-message pairs and
213,349 unique keywords [28]. The 500MB figure is intended to represent LI and
was selected as a round number roughly in line with the cloud storage requirements
for the same Bost scenario (because for LI, all index data is stored locally instead
of in the cloud). To make this size difference more intuitive for participants, we also
describe the storage requirements in terms of the equivalent number of HD photos
or apps.
For the portability feature, we selected the ability to work with old emails
on new devices. This feature distinguishes the basic CI and LI approaches from
their password-protected variations, and is relatively easy to explain. We describe
this feature to participants as follows: “After using the email service on one device
(a phone or laptop) for several months, you buy a new device. You set up the
email service on your new device. Can you read and search old emails on your new
device?” The possible options are “yes” and “no.”
The final feature we consider is privacy. For ease of explanation to users, we
describe the privacy feature as the ability of the email provider to access users’ email
contents and email search queries. Although the actual security properties of various
searchable encryption schemes have subtle differences, for our users we simplify this
feature into three options: standard privacy, extra privacy, and maximum privacy.
Standard privacy describes a scenario with no end-to-end encryption, as is common
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in most email services today. (We found in pilot testing that summarizing this option
as “low” or “no” privacy unduly alarmed users, so we chose standard to reflect the
current common case.) The extra privacy option was described as allowing the
provider to access “some but not all” message contents and search queries, with the
provider having some choice of topics to learn about. This category was designed to
approximate CI solutions. Lastly, maximum privacy was described as the provider
being unable to learn any email or search querty contents. This option was designed
to represent NoSearch as well as LI.
By asking users to choose among various combinations of these feature options,
we can determine the relative value of each feature compared to the rest.
4.2.2 Study setup: Choice-based analysis
The feature set described in the previous section totals six features, with up
to 96 (2 × 2 × 2 × 3 × 2 × 2) possible option combinations for a single profile.
In a traditional full-factorial, full-profile conjoint analysis, participants would be
asked to rank all 96 of these possible profiles; clearly this is an untenable cognitive
burden [114]. To address this, we elect to use a choice-based analysis, in which par-
ticipants make a series of discrete choices between two profiles, rather than ranking
a large set of profiles [115]. We also reduce the set of profiles we examine by using
a fractional-factorial design that consists of a smaller number of orthogonal pro-
files [116]. Prior work has found that participants can handle as many as 17 choice
sets without problems [117]. We therefore construct a set of 16 distinct choice pairs.
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To choose the 16 distinct choice pairs, we generally follow the randomized approach
suggested in [118]. A screenshot of a single choice pair is shown in Figure 4.1, and
the screenshots of all 16 questions used in our study are shown in the appendix.
It is common in conjoint analysis to provide a “no choice” option, indicat-
ing that the participant will choose neither of the presented profiles. In this case,
however, we are primarily interested in learning the relative value of the different
features, so “no choice” options (indicating that a participant would prefer to keep
her existing email service) are somewhat unhelpful. We instead provide a “no pref-
erence” option to allow a participant to indicate that the two choices are (to her)
equivalent.
4.2.3 Protocol and recruitment
We recruited participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing ser-
vice [119] who are 18 or older and fluent in English. To improve data quality,
we required participants to have completed at least 50 prior Human Intelligence
Tasks (HITs) with a HIT approval rating over 95% [120]. Because perceptions of
dollar value and privacy preferences are likely to vary across countries, we restrict
recruitment to Turkers in the United States. We advertised our task as asking par-
ticipants’ preferences about email services, and explicitly did not mention privacy
to avoid self-selection bias. We prevented duplicate participation based on MTurk
ID. Participants were paid $1.50 for the study, which was expected to take less
than 15 minutes. On average, it took participants around 12 minutes to finish our
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questionnaire.
Study participants first received general instructions explaining that they would
be required to answer questions about recommending a new email service to a friend.
These instructions included the overall feature table (Table 4.3). To encourage par-
ticipants to read these instructions carefully, we enforced a six-second delay before
the participant could advance to the next screen. We also required participants to
check a box agreeing that they would “read the instructions and each question care-
fully and think about your answer before you give it. We rely on our respondents
being thoughtful and taking this task seriously.”
The participant was then shown the choice-pair questions, one at a time, as
shown in Figure 4.1. We presented the overall feature table above each question for
the participant’s ongoing reference.
After the choice-pair questions, we asked participants to answer knowledge,
attitude, and demographic questions. These included the six-item abbreviated web-
use skills index [121], which measures web-based tech savviness; the 10-item Internet
Users’ Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) [122], which measures consumer pri-
vacy concern; and standard questions about gender, age, ethnicity, education, and
income. Several privacy concern scales have been developed, each of which has
various benefits and drawbacks; the IUIPC is recommended by Preibusch in his
survey [123].
Our study protocol was approved by the University of Maryland Institutional
Review Board (IRB).
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Figure 4.1: Screenshot of a choice question example
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4.2.4 Data analysis
We used Hierarchical Bayesian (HB) models to analyze choice-based conjoint
data. Compared with other statistical analysis methods, HB models are able to
estimate participants’ preferences not only at the aggregate level (i.e. general pref-
erences from participants), but also at the individual level [124]. We applied the R
package “bayesm” [125] to conduct this HB analysis.
In our HB analysis, we used effects coding method for categorical coding of
feature options [126]. In effects coding, one option of each feature is chosen as the
baseline, to which other options are compared. In our analysis, we selected the
least desirable option for each feature ($1.99, no multi-word search, no partial-word
search, standard privacy, 500MB local storage occupied, and no sync ability) as
baselines.
After our conjoint analysis, we applied linear regression to estimate the ef-
fects of participants’ web-use skill scores and three IUIPC scores (collection, aware-
ness, and control) on their marginal valuation of privacy at different levels. In
order to prevent possibly over-fitting models, we applied the standard backward-
elimination model selection process, until the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is
minimized [127]. For each regression model, we present what variables are selected,
estimated coefficients, and p-values.
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4.2.5 Limitations
Our study has several limitations. Amazon MTurkers are younger, better
educated and more technical than the general U.S. population [128], which may
limit the generalizability of our results. Our participants, though, (as detailed in
Section 5.2.1) showed similar online privacy concerns to the IUIPC scores reported
in [122].
Participants’ self-reported preferences don’t always match their revealed pref-
erences [129, 130]. This means that overall, we expect privacy to be overvalued a
bit in our results. However, requiring participants to make explicit tradeoffs (rather
than simply asking about whether privacy is important) may mitigate this some-
what. We asked participants to recommend email services to their friends instead
of using themselves, to make questions more neutral and less personally fraught.
Although participants’ recommendations may not always align with choices of their
own use, this is a known technique for surveying about sensitive topics [131] and
has been used when investigating app permissions [132]. Overall, we believe our re-
sults can provide a meaningful jumping-off point for understanding how users value
tradeoffs between security and usability features in searchable encrypted messaging
tools, but further work is needed to examine revealed preferences.
To avoid overwhelming our participants, or requiring them to understand com-
plex technical distinctions, we presented participants with only three coarse levels
of available security. In reality, various searchable encryption solutions have sub-
tly but meaningfully different security guarantees [76], and these subtleties are not
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captured in our results. Future work can examine these alternatives in more detail.
More generally, we asked participants to make nuanced decisions that required
reading and thinking about multiple features and option levels. Some participants
may have answered carelessly, or used satisficing rather than thinking deeply about
each option [133]. To mitigate this, we restricted MTurk recruitment (as described
above), we kept the study short, and we iteratively tested our feature descriptions
to make them as clear as possible.
4.3 Results
In this section, we present the demographics of our participants, their prefer-
ences among features and options, and the correlation between their privacy prefer-
ences and their online privacy concerns and web skills.
4.3.1 Participants
In May 2017, we collected 160 completed questionnaires. Self-reported demo-
graphics for the those 160 participants are shown in [134], which shows that 51.3%
of our participants were male, 41.0% were in the age range of 30-39, 80.1% were
Caucasian, and 43.6% held a bachelor’s degree. In addition, 78% participants held
neither a degree nor a job in an IT-related field, and 30% reported household income
in the $50k-$75k range in 2016.
We also measured participants’ web knowledge and online privacy concerns
using two extensively validated scales. To assess web knowledge and skills, we adopt
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the six-item web-use skills index for the general population, developed by Hargittai
et al. [121], which measures web skills on a Likert scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high).
Our participants reported an average score of 4.2 (SD = 0.80). This is higher than
the 3.4 average reported by Hargittai et al., which we attribute to MTurkers having
higher than average internet skills and to population changes since the Hargittai
data was collected in 2010.
To measure internet privacy concern, we adopt the 10-item IUIPC scale de-
veloped by Malhotra et al. [122]. There are several available scales for measuring
privacy, each of which has known weaknesses; the IUIPC scale that we use is recom-
mended by Preibusch as “a safe bet,” but should be interpreted carefully [123]. On
a seven-point scale, with seven indicating highest privacy concern, our participants
averaged 5.9 (SD=0.81) for consumer control, 6.3 (SD=0.66) for awareness of pri-
vacy practices, and 5.61 (SD=1.07) for data collection. These results are comparable
to those Malhotra et al. reported: 5.7, 6.2, and 5.6 respectively.
4.3.2 Results for conjoint analysis
We present participants’ preferences for different features and their options
in this section. We follow the analysis procedures of Burda et al. [34]. We first
calculated the individual and aggregated part-worth utilities for each option. Based
on those utilities, we then estimate the relative importance of each feature, the











$0.00 (free) 1.856 [1.851, 1.860]
32.59%
$1.99 per month -1.856 [-1.860, -1.851]
Privacy
Maximum privacy 1.219 [1.215, 1.223]
24.19%
Extra privacy 0.190 [0.188, 0.192]
Standard privacy -1.409 [-1.413, -1.405]
Local Storage
5 MB 0.635 [0.630, 0.639]
17.38%
500 MB -0.635 [-0.639, -0.630]
Sync old email to
a new device
Yes 0.410 [0.409, 0.411]
9.36%
No -0.410 [-0.411, -0.409]
Multi-word Search
Yes 0.460 [0.458, 0.463]
9.02%
No -0.460 [-0.463, -0.458]
Partial-word Search
Yes 0.392 [0.391, 0.394]
7.46%
No -0.392 [-0.394, -0.391]
Table 4.4: Part-worth utilities of feature options and feature relative importance.
CI stands for “95% confidence interval”.
4.3.2.1 Model fitting
First, we evaluate how well our estimated HB model is fit. In order to evaluate
this goodness-of-fit, we conducted the test suggested in [135]. We calculated the













Price 1.99 → 0.00 3.711
Privacy
Standard → Extra 1.599 [1.438, 1.760] 0.86 [-0.05, 1.77]
Extra → Maximum 1.029 [0.874, 1.185] 0.55 [-0.05, 1.16]
Standard → Maximum 2.628 [2.351, 2.905] 1.41 [-0.01, 2.83]
Local Storage 500 MB → 5 MB 1.269 [0.928, 1.611] 0.68 [-1.12, 2.48]
Sync old email to
a new device
No → Yes 0.819 [0.669, 0.970] 0.44 [-1.40, 2.29]
Multi-word Search No → Yes 0.921 [0.781, 1.060] 0.49 [-0.21, 1.20]
Partial-word Search No → Yes 0.785 [0.682, 0.888] 0.42 [-0.03, 0.87]
Table 4.5: Utility change in feature options and monetary values. CI indicates “95%
confidence interval”.
with a dummy model in which all parameters are zero [135]. This test shows that
our estimated model is statistically valid with LR = 25.89 (p=0.001). In other
words, the hypothesis that our estimated model and the null model are equal can be
rejected. Second, we calculated the hit rate in our 16 choice questions by identifying
for each participant the profile with the highest probability based on the estimated
model, and then determining whether or not that participant actually chose this
profile. The test results in a hit rate of 89.84%, compared to 33% random guessing,
suggesting that our model is well-fitted.
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$0 Multi Partial Extra Max 5MB Sync
$0 1.00 -0.13 -0.04 0.03 0.18 -0.13 -0.07
Multi 1.00 0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.06
Partial 1.00 0.35 -0.09 -0.07 0.12
Extra 1.00 0.03 -0.02 0.07
Max 1.00 -0.13 0.06
5MB 1.00 0.04
Sync 1.00
Table 4.6: Correlation matrix of non-omitted options in HB analysis. Notes: “multi”
means multi-word search supportive; “partial” means partial-word search support-
ive; “extra” and “max” mean extra and maximum privacy, respectively; “5MB”
means 5MB local storage needed; “sync” means synchronizing supportive.
4.3.2.2 Interpreting the model
The outcomes of Hierarchical Bayesian (HB) models are called part-worth util-
ities. Part-worth utilities are a unitless measure of the relative value of different
options within each feature. We use the effects coding method for quantifying fea-
ture options [126]; as such, for each feature, the part-worth utilities will sum to 0,
with the least-desirable option showing a negative part-worth utility. Part-worth
utilities are calculated independently for each participant, then averaged to produce
an overall result.
More formally, the probability of participant n choosing email service profile
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j in question k is shown in Equation 4.1. Xkj is a (1× 8) vector, representing
the coding for “no preference,” “$0,” “multi-word search,” “partial-word search,”
“extra privacy,” “maximum privacy,” “5MB local storage” and “sync ability” for
email service j in question k. β is the vector for part-worth utilities. The coding
for “no preference” is 1 when “no preference” option is chosen by a participant, and
0 otherwise. We included this additional factor in order to get better model fitting





Because part-worth values are scaled arbitrarily, the values themselves cannot
be directly compared across features; instead, only the difference in utility in chang-
ing from one option to another can be compared. For example, Table 4.4 shows that
extra privacy has a part-worth utility of 0.190, while enabling partial-word search
has a part-worth utility of 0.392. This cannot be interpreted directly to mean that
extra privacy is of higher value than partial-word search. Instead, we see in Ta-
ble 4.5 that the utility increase for enabling partial-word search is 0.785, while the
increase from standard to extra privacy is 1.599. This means that when comparing
these two option upgrades, the added privacy is more valuable.
For each part-worth utility, we also report a 95% confidence interval. The
confidence interval helps to establish, with statistical confidence, the strength of
apparent differences between features and options.
To more easily compare features, we use part-worth utilities to calculate the
relative importance of each feature. Relative importance is defined as the ratio of
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the utility range for one feature to the sum of utility ranges across all features. Thus,
relative importance (typically reported as a percentage) indicates how much a given
feature contributes to a user’s overall decision-making. In reporting aggregated
relative importance, we calculate and then average the relative importance for all
participants, rather than computing importance from average utilities.
Finally, to ease interpretation of the results, we calculate each utility change
in terms of dollars. To do this, we divide the utility change from $1.99 to free by
the price difference (trivially, $1.99); this yields the amount of utility change that is
equivalent to $1.99 per month. We then scale the utility changes for other features
accordingly.
4.3.2.3 Estimated user preferences
Table 4.4 presents the aggregated part-worth utilities and relative importance
for each feature. Considering each feature independently, our results show the ex-
pected relations: participants prefer the options that are inherently “better” (such
as free rather than paid, and more privacy rather than less). This serves as an
additional face validation of our results.
We find that with a relative importance of 32.6%, price is on average the
most important factor influencing participants’ choice of an email service. Privacy,
at 24.2%, is second. Overall, participants were willing to pay $0.86 per month
to upgrade from standard to extra privacy, plus an additional $0.55 to upgrade
to maximum privacy. This indicates that the marginal value of privacy, as with
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many goods, is decreasing: our participants seem to believe that once some privacy
improvement is made, further increases are less valuable. Finding that participants
value privacy relatively cheaply aligns well with previous work [137,138].
The third most important factor, after price and privacy, is local storage,
with a relative importance of 17.4%. From Table 4.5, we see that reducing local
storage from 500 to 5 MB is worth about $0.68 per month. This is lower than,
but somewhat comparable to, the $0.86 value of a privacy upgrade from standard to
extra, and higher than the value of an upgrade from extra to maximum privacy. This
suggests that to our participants, local storage is almost as important as privacy
improvements, likely because emails are increasingly sent and received on mobile
devices that have relatively limited storage.
The remaining features — synchronization, multi-word search, and partial-
word search — each have a relative importance under 10%, with dollar values of
$0.50 or less. These values are somewhat comparable to the value of upgrading from
extra to maximum privacy in our taxonomy. Further, upgrading any two of these
three features is as or more valuable than increasing from standard to extra privacy.
Overall, then, while our participants value privacy more than these other features,
the added value is limited.
It is perhaps somewhat surprising that synchronization is rated with such
low importance, given that emails are increasingly accessed on multiple devices;
however, Cecchinato et al. report that email is managed differently on different
devices, and in many cases separate devices manage different accounts [20]. They
further report that searching email occurs primarily on laptops and PCs rather
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than on smartphones. This may help to explain the relatively low value placed on
synchronization in our results.
The relative unimportance of complex search capabilities also aligns well with
prior work. For example, a recent large-scale study found that the majority of search
queries contain only one word [22]. Earlier work reported the existence of “many”
partial-word queries [80], but we find no other evidence that they are frequently
used. Several large webmail services (e.g., Gmail) support partial-word searches
only in limited contexts, so it may be that users have not developed the habit of
depending on this feature.
Figure 4.2: Cumulative distribution of all participants’ relative importance for each
feature.
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4.3.2.4 Variation across participants
We next investigate in more detail how perceived relative importance for each
feature varied among all participants. In Figure 4.2, we present the cumulative dis-
tribution of all participants’ perceived relative importance for each feature. This
figure shows that, as discussed above, price is overall most important, followed by
privacy and then local storage, while the lowest-importance three features cluster
closely together. Price, privacy, and local storage also show more diversity of impor-
tance; the largest preferences reach over 60-70%, while the smallest are very close
to 0. On the contrary, participants have more consensus on the lower perceived
relative importance of multi-word search, partial-word search and synchronization.
4.3.2.5 Correlation among features
Finally, we consider whether any of the features we tested are strongly corre-
lated: that is, whether any of them are strongly preferred together, or are treated as
mutually exclusive. We show the correlation matrix of non-baseline variables in the
Hierarchical Baysian analysis in Table 4.6. Most of the off-diagonal elements in the
table are fairly close to 0, which implies that there are no two particular features
are strongly preferred together or mutually exclusive by participants. The largest
correlation is partial-word search ability with standard privacy (0.35). This positive
coefficient suggests an association between valuing partial-word search more and
valuing privacy less.
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4.3.3 Why do web skills and reported privacy concern matter?
Model Factors Coef. St. Dev. p-value
Std. to Extra Collection 0.288 0.073 <0.001*
Std. to Max Web 0.357 0.177 0.045*
Collection 0.341 0.147 0.022*
Awareness 0.508 0.297 0.0887
Control -0.493 0.232 0.035*
Table 4.7: Regression results for utility changes in privacy options. We separately
model change from standard to extra and from standard to maximum privacy (R2
= 0.083 and 0.075 respectively). These results indicate the final model chosen via
backward selection. Statistically significant factors with p<0.05 are marked as *.
We next consider how participants’ internet skills and generic privacy concerns
affect their preferences for privacy within the email choices we present. To do
this, we apply linear regression to model observed utility change as a function of
a participant’s scores on the web skills index as well as the three subscales of the
IUIPC. We model change from standard to extra privacy, and then separately change
from standard to maximum privacy.
To prevent possibly over-fitting our models, we applied the standard backward-
elimination model selection process, until the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
is minimized [127]. Our final regression results are shown in Table 4.7: we present
which variables are selected, estimated coefficients and their standard deviations,
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and p-values.
The first model includes as a factor only the IUIPC Collection subscale. Mal-
hotra et al. define Collection as degree of concern about “the amount of individual-
specific data possessed by others relative to the value of benefits received” [122].
This model indicates that on average, for each one-point increase in concern as
measured on this Likert subscale, participants value upgrading from standard to
extra privacy an additional 0.288 of utility. This increase is significant.
The second model includes all the examined factors. The results indicate that
greater web skills, as well as a higher Collection score, are significantly correlated
with an increase in the utility of upgrading from standard to maximum privacy.
On the other hand, participants with high scores on IUIPC Control — that is, a
stronger belief that privacy is primarily a function of consumer control — place
significantly lower value on upgrading from standard to maximum privacy. (The
IUIPC Awareness score was not significantly correlated.)
Overall, these results suggest that people who are more tech-savvy, and who
are more concerned about data collection, value privacy more highly; on the other
hand, those who believe in the importance of individual control over data do not
value it as strongly. We hypothesize that perhaps this is because the privacy options
we offered to not exhibit individual fine-grained control, but rather allow the email
service to observe information, or not.
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4.4 Conclusion
In this study, we explored general users’ tradeoffs for search in encrypted
communications. We found that privacy was the most important non-price feature to
our participants, and minimizing the use of local storage was almost as highly valued.
These findings suggested that in the email context, although local indexing may
largely be suitable, there might also be a niche for searchable encryption. For some
users, the potential reduction in privacy relative to a local index will be worthwhile,
in order to save on storage space. In particular, searchable encryption may have
potential as a compromise: more privacy than the current standard, in which email
services have plaintext access to all messages, while limiting some inconveniences
that may prevent broader adoption of end-to-end encryption.
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Chapter 5: Improving Non-Experts’ Understanding of End-to-End
Encryption
In recent years, several popular messaging apps have adopted end-to-end en-
cryption, either by default [9, 139] or as an optional feature [140, 141]. As a result,
E2EE is now readily available to millions of users. However, prior research indicates
that general users have difficulty using end-to-end encrypted tools correctly and
confidently, as well as recognizing their security benefits, in part because of incor-
rect mental models. We believe that enabling users to make appropriate decisions
about how to meet their privacy needs may require at least somewhat improving
mental models, perhaps via better explanations. In this chapter, we take an ini-
tial step toward providing high-level, roughly correct information about end-to-end
encryption to non-experts. In a 25-people lab study, participants were shown one
of several variations on a short tutorial. Participants were asked about their un-
derstanding of end-to-end encryption before and after the tutorial, as well as which
information they found most useful and surprising. Overall, participants effectively
learned many benefits and limitations of end-to-end encryption; however, some con-
cerns and misconceptions still remained, and our participants even developed new
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ones. The results provided insight into how to structure new educational materials
for end-to-end encryption.
5.1 Study Methodology
Figure 5.1: Study Procedure Flow Chart
We designed an in-person study to explore the process of explaining E2EE to
non-experts from several different angles. Participants spent on average 63 minutes
to complete the study.
5.1.1 Study procedure
We designed a primarily qualitative, between-subjects study to investigate
how participants’ understanding and perceptions could be influenced by introducing
different aspects of E2EE. Each participant was shown a tutorial, which presented
one or several aspects of E2EE. Before and after reading the tutorial, participants
were asked to answer a set of quiz questions regarding their perceptions of E2EE,
and then interviewed about why they selected their answers. We next asked them
to comment on our tutorial, to critique some existing E2EE explanations from real
apps, and to design a short message introducing E2EE in their own words. Figure 5.1
outlines our study procedure.
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5.1.1.1 Initial quiz
After agreeing to our consent form, participants first completed a closed-item
quiz printed on paper to assess their understanding of E2EE. In the quiz, partici-
pants were asked to imagine using a hypothetical E2EE messaging app, Textlight, to
send a message to their friend Bob. We chose to use a fictional app so that answers
would not reflect participants’ impressions of existing companies or brands.
The questions explored participants’ understanding of security properties of
E2EE. To address confidentiality, we asked how difficult it would be for various
adversaries to read the content of the message, including: hackers who could inter-
cept communications, hackers who could infiltrate the app company, hackers who
had previously installed malware on users’ phones, ISPs, and government agencies.
We also included two questions addressing integrity and authenticity, asking how
difficult it would be for a third party to modify a message or send a response imper-
sonating the recipient. All these questions included five possible answers on a scale
from “very easy” to “very difficult.” Finally, we asked about the relative security of
different communications tools, including SMS text messaging, mobile phone calls,
email, and instant messaging apps with and without E2EE. After they completed
the quiz, we asked participants to explain their reasoning for each answer. The quiz
questions are listed in Appendix C.1.
96
5.1.1.2 Tutorial and second quiz
We then presented to participants one of several variations of a tutorial we de-
signed (details below), consisting of narration and accompanying PowerPoint slides.
After the tutorial, participants completed the same quiz questions again and were
asked to explain why they had (not) changed their answers. We deliberately con-
ducted this second quiz before any further study tasks, so that answer changes would
reflect the effect of the tutorial and not priming from other questions.
5.1.1.3 Tutorial feedback
We next asked participants to evaluate our tutorial, including how difficult it
was to understand, how informative it was, and which parts they (dis)liked. We
further asked participants to select the most and least surprising and important
information from the tutorial, as well as the part of the tutorial they would most
want their friends and family to learn about. Our goal with these questions was
both to learn what did and did not work about our tutorial specifically, and also
to learn which concepts to prioritize for educational interventions (such as short
messages integrated into messaging tools).
5.1.1.4 Critique
Next, participants were shown two short texts (from six options) introducing
E2EE. The six texts were taken from app descriptions, official websites, and/or
whitepapers of existing secure communication tools, including LINE, WhatsApp,
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Telegram, Viber, Threema, and ProtonMail. Each participant was presented only
two to avoid fatigue. We showed each message almost the same number of times
and balanced them across different tutorial conditions. To avoid branding effects, in
the texts we replaced the actual names of all six apps with Textlight (a fake app we
made up for this purpose). Throughout this chapter, we labeled these six messages
for convenience, which is shown in Table 5.1. Below is the example drawn from
Message ID Msg1 Msg2 Msg3 Msg4 Msg5 Msg6
Tool Names LINE WhatsApp Telegram Viber Threema ProtonMail
Table 5.1: Critique messages for communication tools.
WhatsApp (Msg2); the other messages are provided in Appendix C.3.
Many messaging apps only encrypt messages between you and them,
but TextLight’s end-to-end encryption ensures only you and the person
you’re communicating with can read what is sent, and nobody in be-
tween, not even TextLight. This is because your messages are secured
with a lock, and only the recipient and you have the special key needed
to unlock and read them. For added protection, every message you send
has its own unique lock and key. All of this happens automatically: no
need to turn on settings or set up special secret chats to secure your
messages.
We asked participants to give their general opinions about both messages,
mark phrases or sentences that explained E2EE clearly (or not), describe what else
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they might like these messages to tell them, and choose which message they pre-
ferred. This task had three goals: (a) to gain explicit insight into participants’
perceptions of existing short educational messages; (b) to indirectly observe what
they had retained from the tutorial and/or any remaining misconceptions, as re-
vealed by their reactions to the messages, and (c) to provide some setup for the
subsequent design task.
5.1.1.5 Design
Finally, participants were given a design task: “Could you design a short
introduction as if you want to teach other people about end-to-end encryption? We
don’t expect you to come up with a long document describing every aspect of E2EE.
Instead, please pick the most important pieces you want to convey. Try to come
up with the introduction within 200 words.” Like the Critique task, this task had
multiple concurrent goals: to gain insight into how to design future short educational
interventions, and to observe how participants were able to put information from
the tutorial into action.
5.1.2 Tutorial design
We designed four modules for our E2EE tutorial: a basic overview (O), a
module focused on risks E2EE can and cannot protect against (R), a module explic-
itly debunking misconceptions reported in prior literature (M), and a more detailed






Figure 5.2: Example of visualization used in the tutorial to explain the concept of E2EE,
depicting how an E2EE message is sent from “Your Phone” to “Bob’s Phone”.
(C). Figure 5.2 shows an example slide we used in the tutorial.
5.1.2.1 Overview (O)
The basic overview briefly mentions confidentiality: “with E2EE, only you and
your intended recipients can see the messages.” We also briefly describe how E2EE
protects integrity and authenticity, as well as endpoint weaknesses such as shoulder
surfing, message forwarding, and malware on users’ phones.
5.1.2.2 Risks (R)
The risk module describes in detail the risks to users when not using E2EE.
Prior work has recommended the importance of risk communication with respect to
privacy in messaging [8]. We frame these risks by first illustrating, at a high level,
how messages transit through ISPs and messaging app companies on their way to
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the recipient. This illustration aligns with those presented in prior work [6,68], with
the addition of ISPs. (As we will see below, the role of ISPs in the messaging process
proved surprising to many participants.)
We first highlighted many possible risks of unprotected communication within
this ecosystem: interference at endpoints, at the ISP, at the messaging app server,
and in transit in between. We then discussed how point-to-point encryption (e.g.,
webmail over TLS) could mitigate some of these risks, before finally detailing the
additional mitigations provided by E2EE.
5.1.2.3 Misconceptions (M)
The misconception module focused on three misconceptions or misunderstand-
ings identified in prior work. First, prior research has identified a belief that encryp-
tion is “futile” because no privacy mechanism could be strong enough to protect
from powerful attackers like governments or highly skilled hackers, especially if the
mechanics of the encryption system are known to the attacker [5, 8]. We presented
this misconception to participants and then briefly explained the proven strengths of
(properly configured) encryption algorithms against even well resourced and knowl-
edgeable attackers.
Prior work has also suggested that many users believe that standard audio
calls and SMS messages are more secure than E2EE messaging apps [5, 35]. We
clarified to participants that E2EE messaging is the most secure of these options.
Finally, some users mistakenly believe that authenticity and integrity are con-
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trolled entirely by username and password security [5]. We explained to participants
that even if usernames and passwords are not compromised, without encryption at-
tackers may be able to tamper with messages or impersonate other users.1
5.1.2.4 How Cryptography Works (C)
Our final module explains public key encryption using a lock-and-key metaphor
adapted from [54]. Participants were told that at app installation, a public lock and
private key pair would be created on their phones. All users’ public locks would
be stored at the app company, referencing the key-directory model commonly used
in messaging apps. To send an encrypted message to a friend, the participant’s
device would request the friend’s public lock and use it to lock the message; only
the friend, via possession of the matching private key, would be able to read the
message. Prior work has obtained mixed results on the utility of explaining the
underlying cryptography model [8, 54, 67]. We included this module to investigate
both how it would affect users’ overall understanding and whether they would find
it interesting or important.
5.1.2.5 Tutorial Conditions
To investigate how these different modules affected participants’ knowledge re-
tention and sentiment, we created five conditions, each with a different combination
1In many E2EE messaging apps, authenticity must be explicitly verified via a ceremony; for
simplicity, given the many other concepts we were attempting to convey, we consider details of
authentication ceremonies out of scope for this study.
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of modules. In an exploratory, lab-based study, obtaining enough participants for
a full-factorial design was infeasible; instead, we selected orthogonal combinations
to test different hypotheses. All five conditions include the basic overview (to pro-
vide a common introduction), plus at most two other modules (to avoid making the
tutorial too long). Because we hypothesized (based on prior work) that the cryp-
tography explanation would be least useful, we included it in only one condition.
The five conditions, summarized in Table 5.2, include overview only (O); overview
+ risks (OR); overview + misconceptions (OM); overview + risks + cryptography
(ORC); and overview + risks + misconceptions (ORM).
Module
Condition
O OR OM ORC ORM
Overview (O) X X X X X
Risks (R) X X X
Misconceptions (M) X X
Crypto knowledge (C) X
Table 5.2: Tutorial conditions in our study. Each condition is defined by the set of




We recruited participants who were at least 18 years old and use messaging
apps at least once a week. We selected participants who did not possess any signif-
icant prior cryptographic knowledge, as reported on a prescreening survey. Partici-
pants were recruited via flyers placed around a university campus and in surrounding
neighborhoods, emails sent to university distribution lists, and advertisements on
Craigslist for Washington D.C. area. All interviews took place in person, at Univer-
sity of Maryland, College Park campus, and all sessions were audio recorded (with
permission). Participants were compensated with $20 for completing the one-hour
study and additionally reimbursed for parking when applicable. The study proto-
col used was approved by our University of Maryland’s Institutional Review Board
(IRB).
5.1.4 Data Analysis
All study sessions were audio recorded. Two researchers transcribed three ses-
sions, and the remaining 22 were transcribed by an external transcription service.
The majority of our collected data was qualitative. We applied textual microanal-
ysis to analyze these data [93]. Two researchers iteratively developed a codebook
using responses from 3 participants to capture themes of participants’ responses.
The two researchers then independently coded all participants’ responses. We use
Krippendorff’s α to measure the inter-coder reliability [142]. The average α across
the codebook is 0.85, which is considered reliable [142]. After calculating reliability,
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the researchers met to resolve all disagreements.
Because of the limited sample size, we use changes in quiz responses descrip-
tively, to help contextualize participants’ qualitative responses to the tutorial. We
do not apply hypothesis testing or attempt to make statistical comparisons.
5.1.5 Limitations
Our sample is small, and our participants were younger and more educated
than the general population, potentially limiting generalizability. Most participants
(see below) had heard of encrypted messaging, but few actively used it, and all had
limited knowledge about encryption and related technologies. We therefore believe
our study can provide insight about moderately tech-savvy users who might consider
adopting encrypted messaging. Results from this exploratory study can be used as
a starting point for developing E2EE explanations and validating them with larger
samples.
As in any interview study, participants may have answered quickly rather than
thoroughly [133]; to mitigate this, we used a variety of tasks and follow-up questions.
Demand characteristics suggest that participants might mirror the content of the
tutorials back to the interviewer in an effort to tell us what they thought we wanted
to hear [143]. In this study, attempts to mirror content demonstrate what the
participant has (not) learned and therefore are not a major source of concern.
More broadly, our tutorial necessarily encodes some of the researchers’ judge-
ment about what E2EE concepts are most important for users to learn; this may
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affect participants’ information retention and their responses about importance. We
attempted to mitigate this by providing a broad range of content for participants
to consider and by endeavoring to present all concepts as equally important.
Finally, results from our tutorial, in which participants focused on the material
for several minutes, may not translate directly to real-life contexts, such as glancing
at instructions or introductory material when using a messaging app. Nonetheless,
we believe that insights from our study — particularly which concepts proved most
important and surprising — can provide a foundation for future research into shorter
educational interventions that users encounter in passing.
5.2 Results
In this section, we first briefly describe our participant pool. We then discuss
what participants learned from our tutorial, which mistaken mental models persisted
after the tutorial, and which elements of E2EE participants considered most valuable
to learn about.
5.2.1 Participants
In total, 62 people completed our prescreening survey. We recruited 26 par-
ticipants on a rolling basis, eliminating one who withdrew from the study in the
middle. The demographics of participants and the tutorial conditions they were as-
signed can be seen in Table 5.3. Fourteen of 25 participants were female and 21 were
between the ages of 18 and 29, so our participants were younger than average. The
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ID Gend. Age Eth. Crit. Familiarity
O1 F 18-29 Black 1,2 not heard of
O2 M 18-29 Asian 1,5 use frequently*
O3 M 18-29 Asian 2,6 not heard of
O4 M 18-29 Black 3,5 not heard of
O5 F 30-39 Black 4,6 use frequently
OR1 F 18-29 Black 1,4 heard of, do not use
OR2 F 18-29 Asian 2,3 not heard of
OR3 F 18-29 Asian 2,6 use occasionally
OR4 F 18-29 White 4,5 heard of, do not use
OR5 F 30-39 Black 5,6 not heard of
OM1 M 30-39 Black 1,3 use frequently
OM2 F 18-29 Black 1,5 heard of, do not use
OM3 M 18-29 Asian 2,4 use frequently
OM4 F 18-29 Other 3,6 not heard of
OM5 M 18-29 White 4,6 heard of, do not use
ORC1 M 18-29 Black 1,2 use occasionally
ORC2 F 18-29 White 1,6 heard of, do not use
ORC3 F 18-29 Asian 3,4 use frequently*
ORC4 F 18-29 White 3,6 not heard of
ORC5 M 18-29 Asian 4,5 heard of, do not use
ORM1 M 18-29 Asian 1,3 not heard of
ORM2 M 50-59 N/A 1,6 heard of, do not use
ORM3 F 18-29 White 2,5 not heard of
ORM4 F 18-29 Asian 2,5 heard of, do not use
ORM5 M 18-29 Hispanic 3,4 not heard of
Table 5.3: Participant demographics including, gender, age, ethnicity, messages
critiqued, and pre-existing familiarity with encrypted or secure mobile instant mes-
saging. The ID indicates the tutorial condition. Two participants who only use
WeChat but identified themselves as frequent users of encrypted tools were marked
with *.
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participants tended to have an educated background, with 19 holding a bachelor’s
or master’s degree.
Only one participant reported having an education in computer security, com-
puter science, computer engineering, or IT and none reported familiarity with cryp-
tographic algorithms. Eighteen participants reported either not having heard of or
not having used encrypted or secure messaging, while five reported that they ac-
tively use such messaging. However, two out of five participants who thought they
were actively using encrypted or secure messaging used WeChat only.
Participants reported using a variety of messaging tools at least once a week.
The majority use Facebook Messenger (20) and iMessage (16). Some reported using
Snapchat (12), SMS text messaging (12), Google Hangouts (8), and WhatsApp (6).
Four participants or fewer reported using each of WeChat, Telegram, KakaoTalk,
Google Allo, GroupMe, Instagram Messenger, and Twitter.
5.2.2 Tutorials improved users’ mental models, regardless of condi-
tion
Participants’ understanding of E2EE improved, across all five tutorial versions.
This is reflected in changes to their quiz answers after viewing the tutorial, as well
as their interview comments.
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5.2.2.1 Participants improved their understanding of messages in
transit
Our quiz included two adversaries related to threats in transit: hackers who
could eavesdrop in the middle and ISPs. Participants learned that E2EE could
protect their messages from these two adversaries: 13 and 10 participants lowered
their scores (perceiving eavesdropping to be more difficult) in these two questions,
with an average score change of 1.1 and 0.7 (out of five points), respectively.
Before reading the tutorial, participants held several misconceptions about
these potential adversaries. Seven participants thought these adversaries could not
learn message content because these adversaries were not part of the conversation,
and four (one overlapping) were surprised to learn that ISPs were involved in the
communication. For example, ORM1 said “[ISPs] are even more outside, like, the
actors involved in the communication, [they are] not the company making the app
and they’re not any of the users, it will be very hard for them to open up the message
itself.” OR3 commented, “I thought this was one to one relations. Even though
they provide the service. . . . Like KakaoTalk, I believe that company can access to
my messages, but I’ve never thought that the provider, Verizon [could]. I thought
that they just provide the transportation.” ORC2 did not realize the recipient’s
ISP was involved, believe the app company would send the message directly to its
recipient.
On the other hand, six participants believed before the tutorial that ISPs could
potentially learn any message, since they provide the internet service for phones. As
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OR2 said, “I think they have access to everything you send through the network.”
After the tutorial, these participants recognized that encryption (point-to-point or
end-to-end) could address this issue.
5.2.2.2 Participants learned that E2EE can provide protection from
app companies and government agencies
Comparing quiz scores before and after the tutorial, participants understood
better that E2EE could protect their messages from app companies and government
agencies. The average score of app company was lowered from 3.16 to 1.36, and
that of government decreased from 3.64 to 1.76.
Before the tutorial, seventeen participants who thought E2EE messages were
vulnerable to these adversaries incorrectly mentioned plaintext messages being stored
at the app company, where governments could also request them. Besides, in line
with findings from Abu-Salma et al. [5], eleven suggested that these relatively pow-
erful adversaries could simply break the encryption.
After the tutorial, 22 participants recognized that E2EE prevents plaintext
messages from being stored at the app company and can defend against even pow-
erful adversaries. OR2 stated, “Using E2EE there will be a shield. . . . The company
would know there is a message that exists, but they wouldn’t know what content it
contains.” ORM5 similarly commented, “It’s easy for the government to get a copy
. . . but with E2EE they won’t be able to break the encryption to see what’s inside
of the message.”
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5.2.2.3 Participants better recognized E2EE limitations
After the tutorial, 10 participants rated the risk to communications at the
endpoints (even when using E2EE) higher than they had initially, and the number
of participants who correctly understood that E2EE could not protect them from
malware on their phones increased from 16 to 21. Before reading the tutorial,
six participants thought encryption could protect against malware at endpoints:
“Malware [is] getting access to the activities, but . . . the message is still going to be
encrypted” (OM2). Two participants did not understand before the tutorial how
malware related to message privacy at all.
OM2 updated his opinion after the tutorial: “If malware’s already installed
on your phone, then it’s not really protected because they have access to the orig-
inal message before it’s even encrypted.” This perspective was also new to OM4,
who “was surprised to find out that if a hacker installs malware they can take off
the encryption.” ORM2 was very specific in pointing out that E2EE could protect
against “two out of those three risks: the transit ones, and the app company, but
not the user phones.”
5.2.3 Some concerns and misunderstandings remained; others devel-
oped
Although our tutorial improved participants’ understanding of E2EE overall,
we found that some participants retained existing concerns and misconceptions, and
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even developed new ones.
5.2.3.1 Confidentiality concerns remain
After the tutorial, eight participants remained unconvinced that E2EE could
provide sufficient confidentiality, most often with respect to powerful adversaries.
For example, OR5 argued that government agencies have “both the resources and
the knowledge base to crack an algorithm.” Similarly, ORC4 continued to believe
that the app company would inherently have enough knowledge about the encryption
process to access messages: “If the company creates the encryption or whatever, I’m
assuming there is some sort of maybe possibility of them decrypting it . . . because
I was thinking if Bob gets a lock and a key, creates whatever, . . . then the locks
go here [to the company], so the company still has your lock, meaning even if it’s
encrypted wouldn’t they be able to at some point decrypt it?” ORC2 suggested that
skilled hackers could similarly overcome E2EE: “Because I’m thinking of it literally,
although I’m sure it’s not, as a key and lock mechanism, I would imagine that if
you work in a locksmith office, if you’re an expert in keys and locks, you might not
have somebody’s key but you would be able to get into their house because you are
an expert and you know how to manipulate systems.”
5.2.3.2 E2EE is less secure than other communication methods
Four participants ranked one of SMS, email, or direct phone call as the most
secure communications method even after the tutorial. Some argued that voice
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conversations are more transient than written messages: “It’s just talk. That’s
most likely to be forgotten” (O4). OR1, on the other hand, preferred phone calls
as a means to establish authenticity: “I feel like if I know someone, like if I know
my friend or someone in my family, it’s very hard to mimic that voice . . . . With a
phone call, I’d be like, ‘Oh, that’s not you.’ ”
5.2.3.3 Point-to-point encryption is devalued
All modules of our tutorial emphasized the benefits of E2EE. The risks module
explicitly distinguishes point-to-point encryption from E2EE, but also mentions that
most non-E2EE messaging apps are encrypted point-to-point. This nuance does not
seem to have been entirely absorbed. ORC2 recalled from the tutorial that non-
E2EE messaging apps “[take] out the first threat even though there are the other
threats. So maybe it’s not quite as easy” as with no protection; however, she still
ranked such apps behind standard voice calling in the security ranking question.
Among the 15 participants who viewed the Risk module, 10 retained their security
ranking for these apps (relative to E2EE apps, standard email, SMS and standard
phone calls), among whom seven still ranked non-E2EE messaging in fourth or last
place. Four other participants reduced their ranking for these apps. This suggests
that researchers, designers, and advocates promoting the benefits of E2EE must be
careful not to inadvertently push consumers toward least secure options when E2EE
is unavailable or undesirable.
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5.2.3.4 Integrity and authenticity remain confusing despite some im-
provement
Prior work has found that users’ mental models for encrypted communication
do not effectively consider integrity and authenticity [5, 8], and our findings accord
with these prior studies. Before the tutorial, most participants did not think in-
tegrity (14) or authenticity (18) could easily be violated in E2EE communication;
however, many did not relate this difficulty to E2EE, instead believing that such
violations would be inherently difficult in any messaging system. Eleven partici-
pants believed that these violations would require multiple unlikely steps, and three
believed an attacker could never be fast enough to alter a message in transit. OR3
said “They have to read it and they have to manipulate the contents. So it’s not
very easy. . . . There should be an extra step, I think,” and OR4 said, “It would have
to happen while the [sender]’s typing, cause like if they get the message instanta-
neously, then...They’d have only like a second to change it.” Eleven participants,
meanwhile, believed integrity and authenticity were determined entirely by protec-
tion of usernames and passwords, rather than any vulnerability in transit.
After the tutorial, participants were more likely to recognize that E2EE could
protect integrity and authenticity. As OR5 explained, messages “have the end-to-
end encryption, and if the phone’s not stolen, it’s going to be difficult.” While these
participants believed the tutorial’s assertion that E2EE can assure integrity and
authenticity, exactly how E2EE provides this protection remained blurry to them.
Seven continued to confuse integrity with confidentiality. For example, O5 remarked
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that “there’s really nothing for him (the attacker) to modify because he doesn’t
know the contents of the message.” (To be fair, properly designed E2EE tools
should protect both confidentiality and integrity without requiring the user to make
a distinction.) Further, two participants continued to believe that a limited time
window for action would prevent an integrity or authenticity violation, and other
participants continued to conflate authenticity with username and password issues.
O5 suggested that “E2EE protects against message modification and impersonation.
Not even usernames and or passwords can be stolen or guessed.”
Relatedly, the integrity and authenticity discussion in the Misconceptions mod-
ule was cited by several participants as the least effective section of the tutorial, with
three explicitly mentioning that it was unclear or confusing. This may be because
these concepts are inherently difficult to explain, because we happened to explain
them poorly, or both.
5.2.3.5 E2EE protects against malware
While many participants increased their understanding of endpoint threats
after the tutorial, five participants lowered their scores with respect to malware in
the quiz, indicating an increased belief that E2EE could protect against malware
on their phones. As ORM3 explained, “Even if you put the malware on the phone,
it’s not gonna give you access because the data is so well encrypted.” OR4 con-
curred that “By using E2EE, you decrease the likelihood that someone can hack into
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your phone.” These results underscore the importance of ensuring that educational
interventions do not give users a false sense of security.
5.2.4 What knowledge should we impart?
In this section, we discuss the information that was most salient to our par-
ticipants, including what they found most important and most surprising as well as
what they chose to disseminate to others.
5.2.4.1 Confidentiality is most significant
Unsurprisingly, confidentiality was the most significant information to our par-
ticipants. It was selected 13 times as the most important information and nine times
as the most surprising, which were each more than other themes. O1 said “the in-
ability of other parties to read your messages” was most important because “that
actually is the primary purpose of end-to-end encryption.” ORM5 was surprised
that “the internet service provider and the app company . . . may still get a copy of
the message, that is protected by this wall, that is nearly impossible to break. So
they can see you sent a message, but they can’t see what the message says.” OR2
was similarly surprised that with E2EE, even the government could not read the
message content: “I thought the government could always read what you have sent
because, like, you always heard in the news that some student said something stupid
on their phone and they got deported or something. . . . So I always thought that the
government can read everything you send. But now today I realize, oh they can’t.”
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When asked about what information they would tell others, 17 participants
mentioned confidentiality. For example, OM2 would tell a friend “that if you use
E2EE on a messaging platform, it is going to be the most secure way that you can
send messages. . . . It has kind of like a very, very, strong protective layer around the
message so that people can’t intercept the message and retrieve its contents. It will
only be accessible to the intended recipient.”
The importance of confidentiality was also reflected in critiquing existing mes-
sages and designing new ones. Almost everyone pointed positively to portions of
existing mentions that mention confidentiality, and 20 participants mentioned it in
their own messages. O5 wrote in his message that “E2EE is a great way to en-
sure that your messages will be securely transmitted to the recipient of the message
originally intended for. The data is encrypted where no one has directed access to
the text contents but the sender and the receiver of the information. Not even the
monitoring company, hackers and the government can see the message.”
5.2.4.2 Risks are useful to communicate how E2EE and non-E2EE
differ
In addition to confidentiality, the risks of non-E2EE messaging were also com-
monly mentioned. Of 15 participants who saw the Risks module (OR, ORC, ORM),
six reported that risks were most important to discuss and five reported risks as
most surprising. All six who mentioned risks as important noted that risks were
most useful to clearly differentiate E2EE from non-E2EE communications. For in-
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stance, ORC4 said “I think, again, knowing the risks of the non-E2EE and then
really comparing it to how is this better. So that’s really the most important.”
OR1 agreed that “this is all very important as consumers in the United States . . . I
think they just want the bottom line, like okay, what is the difference? So, I think
the risk factors are probably the biggest takeaway.”
When asked what information they would tell their friends or family about
E2EE, overall 10 participants specifically mentioned risks, among whom seven had
seen our Risk module. As with importance, these participants used risks specifically
to explain why E2EE was better than non-E2EE: ORM3 said he would start by
explaining the risks of non-E2EE messaging and then explaining that E2EE “really
protects it [your message] while it’s in transit and while it’s at the app company.
. . . It can’t be modified or impersonated or whatever. . . . The end-to-end encrypted
apps basically protect your message along the entire pathway and it’s the most
secure way to send a message.” OR4 agreed that “showing them the benefits of
encryption so it’s less likely your information will be hacked would probably be
beneficial,” particularly in the context of many data breaches in the news.
The usage of risks to distinguish E2EE from non-E2EE was similarly reflected
in participants’ designed messages. OR5 wrote, “Your information is exposed every
time you utilize your mobile device. There are three potential exposures, the service
providers, the app company, and hackers. In efforts to protect yourself against these
parties, please ensure your devices has E2EE protection.” ORM4 began with a
detailed message about risks, concluding that “it is essential to find ways to provide
more security when communicating over the web,” before going on to explain how
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E2EE could address these risks.
5.2.4.3 Explaining weaknesses can be important
We introduced three endpoint weaknesses in the tutorial — shoulder surfing,
message forwarding, and malware — but malware primarily drew our participants’
attention. Four and five participants reported that this information was the most
important and most surprising, respectively. ORC4 explained that “If you’re pre-
senting this as a product, I think it’s important to [be] realistic and inform people.”
O3 agreed: “The malware piece is important for me to know if I’m specifically look-
ing at TextLight company and what is not protected . . . because I want to know to
what extent is this actually going to be secure?” Similarly, four participants said
that if they were to introduce E2EE to other people, they would mention the limi-
tations, and 13 participants acknowledged the limitations straightforwardly in their
designed messages. For example, OR4 wrote that “While there are benefits to using
E2EE, everyday risks still pose a threat, like a thief stealing your phone, someone
looking over your shoulder, or if someone installs malware on an unlocked phone.”
Among the messages critiqued by participants, only Msg3 pointed out the
possible weaknesses: “But please remember that we cannot protect you from your
own mother if she takes your unlocked phone without a passcode. Or from your
IT-department if they access your computer at work. Or from any other people
that get physical or root access to your phones or computers running TextLight.”
This information was marked as especially useful by five participants out of eight
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who saw this message. These participants noted positively both the content of the
information and the humorous tone. (However, two participants including ORM5
noted that “root access” was jargon: “I don’t know what root access means. What
happened?”)
5.2.4.4 Cryptography details should be used with caution
We observed mixed reactions to technical details presented in our Crypto
Knowledge module and in the existing messages that participants critiqued.
Cryptography details can be interesting or reassuring, but are not necessary Five
participants in ORC saw the Crypto Knowledge module. Only one of these par-
ticipants selected this module as important, because “you cannot tell people this
thing is so good, but you don’t tell them why” (ORC3). O3, who did not see the
Crypto Knowledge module but did critique a message that used the same lock-and-
key metaphor (Msg2) remarked that this information “made it a little bit more
understanding of what encryption could look like, even though it’s not probably
how it works.”
A few participants who reacted positively to crypto details (in our tutorial
or in the critiqued messages) were reassured by the information that a secret key
was known only to the user and their devices, as pointed out in Msg4 and Msg6.
ORM2, for example, noted that this “eliminates all possibility on service providers
that access because it doesn’t have the ability to decipher the information. Well, it
says they don’t have the encryption keys in order to break the codes.”
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None of the ORC participants mentioned crypto knowledge or the lock and key
metaphor when asked what they would tell their friends and family about E2EE.
Eight of 25 participants’ message designs messages mentioned cryptography, includ-
ing three that mentioned keys known only to the user and not the app company.
Interestingly, seven participants from conditions other than ORC expressed
interest in learning more details about how E2EE works. One participant who did
see the Crypto Knowledge module said the module was insufficiently detailed and
wished to learn more.
Technical details can create confusion On the other hand, some participants were
confused by technical details. “This [tutorial] is intended for new users, people who
don’t know anything, like me. This [crypto explanation] is helpful, but I don’t need
to know exactly how it happens because I can understand what encryption means to
some extent” (P1). The same participant similarly found the explanation in Msg4,
which referred to “a code that only the recipient’s device can translate into plain
text,” confusing: “I think it’s trying to describe the mechanism into encryption, like
how it works, but it didn’t do a good job.” Other participants found specific details
confusing: OM5 associated a key with a password and asked, “How do you have a
key that you have to put in every time to see a message?” ORM3 was confused by
the assertion in Msg5 that “the user is in control over the key exchange,” asking,
“Do I have to do something? How does that key exchange happen?” Two other
participants expressed similar feelings.
Msg2, sourced from WhatsApp, uses the same lock-and-key metaphor we
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adopted for the Crypto Knowledge module. Seven of eight participants who cri-
tiqued this message liked the analogy, and three thought it explained encryption
well, but three found the specific language confusing. In particular, O1 thought
that the message’s reference to a “special key” was “flowery” and “corny.” OR2 ob-
jected to the message’s reference to unique locks and keys for “added protection”:
“What does it mean by ‘added protection?’ I don’t get it. . . . You already lock it
once, why do I have to to lock it twice?”
Msg5 (Threema) explains E2EE as two layers of protection, a “transport layer”
and an “end-to-end encryption layer,” emphasizing that “the crucial part is that
the end-to-end encryption layer passes through the server uninterrupted; the server
cannot remove the inner encryption layer.” Four of eight participants agreed this
explanation increased their confidence in E2EE protection, but five participants
worried that it was too technical or even boring to non-experts. OM2 said he
couldn’t picture what this would look like: “I didn’t really understand the difference
between them. I didn’t understand if it was an inner layer or outer layer, whatever
that meant. It was just frustrating . . . I didn’t know what it meant by passes through
uninterrupted, like does it stop working, or whatever.”
Of the eight participant-designed messages that mentioned cryptography, four
attempted to apply the lock-and-key metaphor, and three made minor technical
errors, including suggesting that the lock and key themselves were encrypted, and
providing a symmetric-encryption-like explanation.
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5.2.4.5 Other concepts were less important to participants
Other ideas covered in our tutorial and in the critique messages, including
integrity and authenticity, comparison with other tools, and algorithm security, did
not receive much attention from our participants.
Integrity and authenticity Integrity and authenticity were briefly discussed in the
basic Overview module seen by all participants, and then explained in more detail
as part of the Misconceptions module seen by 10 participants.
Only a few participants selected integrity and authenticity as important (1) or
surprising (2). O1 chose integrity and authenticity as both important and surprising:
“I didn’t know that there was a system that could prevent that from happening.”
Three participants mentioned integrity and/or authenticity when choosing infor-
mation to tell a friend or family member, and six included them in the messages
they designed. This unpopularity may relate to the fact that we were relatively
unsuccessful explaining these concepts to our participants (Section 5.2.3.4).
Comparison with other tools Ten participants in OM and ORM learned in our
Misconceptions module that E2EE messaging is more secure than standard email,
phone calls, and SMS. Four participants mentioned this fact as most important, and
two mentioned it as most surprising. As ORM4 said the most surprising thing was
“probably the misconception that E2EE is more secure than the other methods,
’cause I thought that phone calls was the most secure form since it’s using your
voice and not actually recorded.” Only two participants included a comparison to
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other communications mechanisms in the messages they designed.
Algorithm security We also included in our Misconceptions module information
about algorithm strength; this was intended to combat the finding in prior work that
many users assume that an expert who understands the cryptography can always
break it [5]. This information did not prove very salient to the 10 participants (OM,
ORM) who learned it: only two mentioned it as most important and two as most
surprising. ORM3 was most surprised that “it would take like a million years or
something . . . ’cause I feel like you always hear about hackers . . . I was surprised just
how secure it is.”
Four participants from these conditions mentioned algorithm security in the
messages they designed, in all cases as a way to emphasize confidentiality. As ORM1
wrote, “The algorithms that are utilized here are extremely strong and would take
third parties an impossible amount of time to crack and decrypt.”
5.2.5 Other feedback about educational interventions
Finally, we report some additional feedback from participants about our tuto-
rial, as well as about the existing texts they critiqued.
5.2.5.1 The tutorial was generally well received
Overall, participants rated the tutorial as easy to understand (mean 4.9 on a
five-point Likert scale) and informative (mean 4.5). While these high scores may
partially reflect demand effects, participants’ detailed comments suggest that they
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appreciated the simple language and visualizations in the tutorial. OM2 said “I think
it was easy because you used very clear, simple and concise language. Additionally,
with the visuals, it was very easy to understand what was happening. The visuals
really, I think, facilitated my understanding of what the message was trying to
convey.” Other participants, such as ORM1, said they gained new knowledge: “It
was pretty informative. I learned a lot that I didn’t know before, clarifying how
messaging apps actually work, the risks and how encryption can help protect you
against that.” Participants including O1 also said the length was about right: “Since
it’s a short presentation, I’m sure there was more to learn. However, I don’t think
anyone needed to know more than that. So I think it was good.”
A few participants, however, commented on tutorial elements that were not
clear. The majority of these comments referenced integrity and authenticity; as
described above, our tutorial did not succeed in explaining these nuanced concepts
effectively.
5.2.5.2 Wording should be clear and simple
Participants’ critiques of the five existing messages revealed several instances
where overly complicated explanations, jargon, and related issues inhibited under-
standing.
As one example, both Msg2 and Msg5 mention that E2EE is applied auto-
matically (a fact that several participants appreciated). Participants preferred the
shorter, clearer wording in Msg5 (five likes, no dislikes) to the longer version in
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Msg2 (two likes, three dislikes); O3 disliked that the automation description in
Msg2 seemed to be “trying really hard to persuade.” Three participants who viewed
these messages went on to mention automation in the messages they designed.
Participants struggled with Msg1’s use of “chat rooms” (O1, ORC1, OR1),
which was considered outdated and evoked group rather than one-to-one communi-
cation. (We speculate that the use of “chat room” may be more standard in East
Asia, where LINE is more popular.) Three out of eight participants who viewed
Msg3 (Telegram) struggled with technical terms like ISP, network administrator,
and third parties.
The first sentence from Msg2 (WhatsApp) begins “Many messaging apps only
encrypt messages between you and them.” Three of eight participants who viewed
this text were confused about who “them” referred to. O3 correctly guessed “they”
were the messaging apps, but O1 assumed that “they” were message receivers and
consequently misunderstood the rest of the sentence.
5.2.5.3 Reaction to ad-targeting prevention was surprisingly mixed
Msg4 (Viber) explains that use of E2EE can prevent data collection that later
leads to targeted ads in another setting. Five of eight participants who viewed this
add commented on this as a desirable feature, although no one included it in the
message they designed. To our surprise, two participants were confused by this,
as the messaging apps they were familiar with did not typically contain ads. This
misconception is perhaps attributable to poor wording in Msg4 as well as to generally
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poor understanding of how behavioral advertising and retargeting work [144]. We
leave it to future work to explore how secondary privacy benefits such as prevention
of ad targeting — when clearly explained — affect users’ overall impressions of
E2EE.
5.3 Conclusion
In this study, we explored how to improve general users’ mental models of end-
to-end encryption. We designed a tutorial with four modules: a brief overview, risks
associated with non-E2EE communication, corrections to three common misconcep-
tions, and a high-level description of how E2EE technically works. We evaluated
what our participants learned, what misconceptions they retained, and which infor-
mation they found most valuable. We found that overall our tutorials were effective
at conveying high-level security properties of E2EE, including potential weaknesses
at endpoints. They also corrected certain existing misconceptions about who has
access to messages in transit. We found that the risks module effectively conveyed
intended ideas about the relative risks of E2EE and non-E2EE communications, but
the misconceptions module did not effectively address confusion about integrity and
authenticity. The technical description increased understanding somewhat for some
participants, but also promoted misunderstanding for others, and was not considered
particularly important or useful. The critique activities, meanwhile, revealed several
points of confusion within existing messages. Overall, participants’ responses sug-
gested that emphasizing confidentiality, clearly conveying the limitations of E2EE
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protections, and reducing complexity are the most important properties for effective
education. We hope that these recommendations can inform the design of interven-
tions that can be integrated more naturally into users’ communication workflows,




This dissertation investigates the adoption of end-to-end encrypted communi-
cation from a variety of user-centered perspective. Based on our studies, we provide
some recommendations to the community.
6.1 Choosing Among Key Management Models
In Chapter 3, we conducted the first study examining how non-expert users,
briefly introduced to the topic, think about the privacy and convenience tradeoffs
that are inherent in the choice of encryption models, rather than about user-interface
design tradeoffs.
We found that while participants recognized that the exchange model could
provide better overall privacy, they also recognized its potential for self-defeating
mistakes. Similarly, our participants acknowledged potential security problems in
the registration model, but found it “good enough” for many everyday purposes,
especially the option to audit the system and/or split trust among several parties
was added. This result is particularly encouraging for approaches like CONIKS and
Google’s potential end-to-end extension, which spread trust among many potential
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and actual auditors. It is important to note that understanding the identities and
motivations of third-party auditors was important to several of our participants,
so making this auditing process as open and transparent as possible may prove
important to its success.
We believe our results have important implications for designers of encryption
tools as well as researchers, policymakers, journalists, and security commentators.
Alarmed denunciations of tools that do not offer perfect privacy may only serve to
scare users away from any encryption at all, given that many users already believe
encryption is either too much work or unnecessary for their personal communica-
tions. Instead, making clear both the marginal benefit and the risk can support
better decision making. This also underscores the critical importance of making
risks explicit up front, in plain non-technical language; users who are misled into a
false sense of security may misjudge tradeoffs to their detriment.
As end-to-end encryption is increasingly widely deployed, designers and com-
panies must make choices about which models to adopt. We believe our results can
provide some additional context for making these decisions, relative to the targeted
use cases and user population.
6.2 Adding Search to End-to-End Encryption
In Chapter 4, we took the first step in characterizing user-facing tradeoffs
inherent in supporting search for an encrypted communication solution. We consid-
ered six features, which provide interesting distinction across the space of possible
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approaches: price, multi-word search ability, partial-word search ability, privacy,
local storage occupation, and synchronizing capability.
We found that among the non-monetary features we evaluated, privacy ranked
highest overall, with local storage second. However, the value of a secondary privacy
improvement — defined in our study as moving from extra to maximum privacy —
was slightly less than the value of changing from 500 to 5 MB of local storage.
Advanced search features using multiple words and partial-word matching were less
valuable overall.
These results have important implications for the design of encrypted com-
munication systems, and in particular for supporting search features. Current en-
crypted instant-messaging systems rely on a local-index solution, which provides
maximum privacy (assuming no endpoint compromise) but also requires additional
local storage. Searchable encryption approaches, in contrast, give up some degree of
privacy, and limit the flexibility of the searches that can be conducted, but reduce
the requirement for local storage.
Our results suggest, then, that at least in the email context, there is a po-
tentially valuable niche for a searchable encryption solution. For some users, the
potential reduction in privacy relative to a local index will be worthwhile. In line
with prior work, we find that most users do not find significant value in advanced
searching capabilities. Overall, this suggests that designers of searchable encryption
schemes with email in mind concentrate on privacy and convenience, rather than
support for increasingly complex search operations.
Further, our results suggest that searchable encryption may have potential as
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a reasonable compromise point: more privacy than the current standard, in which
email services have plaintext access to all messages, while limiting some inconve-
niences that may prevent broader adoption of end-to-end encryption.
Our results also show high variation in the relative values of privacy and storage
among different participants. We also found that privacy concern and web-use skill
are positively correlated with higher valuation of privacy, and particularly higher
marginal valuation of additional privacy. This suggests that rather than attempting
to develop one suitable solution to enabling end-to-encryption for email, different
solutions may be most appropriate for different user groups. Users with more web
experience, with higher base levels of privacy concern, and/or with fewer limitations
in e.g. local storage may prefer a local-index solution, while others may prefer a
searchable-encryption solution. One possible option might be to provide a simple
configuration switch offering the user more privacy/more storage or less privacy/less
storage, and then implementing either a local index or searchable encryption accord-
ingly. Simple tradeoff language may be appropriate for many users, potentially with
a “more information” link to provide details to those who want or need them.
6.3 Helping Users Understand End-to-End Encryption
Throughout our dissertation, helping users understand end-to-end encryption
is a key component, which either serves as the necessity to complete the study tasks
(Chapters 3 and 4), or acts as the main purpose of the study (Chapter 5).
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6.3.1 Users Could Understand End-to-End Encryption
Our results suggest that it may be reasonable to explain in clear language
what the high-level risks of a given encryption approach are and trust users to make
decisions accordingly. In Chapter 3, our participants could understand at least some
high-level security properties of the underlying key management models used in end-
to-end encryption, and could coherently trade these properties off against factors like
convenience. In Chapter 4, although the purpose of this study was not to design the
best way to present information about email service privacy, our participants valued
initial privacy improvement more than the secondary privacy improvement when
different privacy levels were presented explicitly. In Chapter 5, our participants’
understanding of E2EE was overall improved by reading the tutorial designed by
us. In general, we observed improvement in understanding how E2EE can protect
confidentiality, how it compares to non-E2EE mechanisms, and its limitations. Our
participants could better recognize potential adversaries, such as internet service
providers, that they had not previously considered as relevant; they also newly
recognized that E2EE can provide protection even against powerful adversaries like
app companies and governments. Further, the tutorial helped participants recognize
that E2EE cannot protect against endpoint threats such as malware.
We do, however, advise some caution. Although most participants understood
several aspects of end-to-end encryption at a high level by learning our tutorials,
participants still maintained some existing concerns and misunderstandings, and
even developed new ones. As an example, our attempt to clarify authenticity and
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integrity in Chapter 5 — an in particular to disentangle it from password security —
was not successful. Further, some participants maintained their belief that standard
voice calls are inherently more secure than any text communication, including E2EE
messaging.
6.3.2 Helping Users in the Field
Despite years of effort from the security community, effectively communicat-
ing the security properties of end-to-end encryption remain difficult. The Electronic
Frontier Foundation’s Secure Messaging Scorecard, which tracks the security prop-
erties of encryption tools, provides an valuable start in this direction [66], although
it was shown not as effective as expected [5]. In Chapter 5, we took the first study
to evaluate existing end-to-end introductory texts drawn from real tools like What-
sApp and Threema. We found that many of these messages contain confusing or
misleading wording and technical jargon that could create misunderstandings even
for users with time and motivation to carefully read instructions.
However, echoing with prior work that placing information about security up
front can lead to users making more security-protective decisions [132], we believe
our endeavors presented in this dissertation demonstrate the benefits of continuing
to try to help users understand benefits and tradeoffs of end-to-end encrypted com-
munications, which could be crucial to users’ ability to make meaningful decisions
about their choice of communication channels. Of course, participants in our three
studies were directly instructed to read the materials we gave them, either verbally
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imparted (Chapters 3 and 5), or forced to read online (Chapter 4). In practice, real
users often have neither the time nor the motivation to seek out this kind of in-
formation. We therefore distill — from our participants’ responses to the tutorials,
their critiques of existing messages, and their efforts to design new messages — key
elements that we hope can translate to shorter educational interventions, such as
those on apps’ webpages, in their installation descriptions, or in interstitial screens.
Our recommendations are as follows:
• Confidentiality is the primary ingredient. Our participants placed high-
est importance on conveying how E2EE can protect users’ messages from being
read by various adversaries, as shown in all studies in our dissertation. This
can be underscored by references to risk, algorithm strength, and the com-
parative security of different communications methods in Chapter 5. Perhaps
most important is to explicitly explain protection against relatively powerful
adversaries, as this information was most surprising to many participants.
• Risks can be used to support comparison. One way to effectively em-
phasize confidentiality is to detail the risks that distinguish E2EE from, e.g.,
point-to-point encryption. This improves users’ mental threat models and can
provide a stronger sense of security that may help to motivate adoption.
• Technical details only in small doses. While understanding how E2EE
works seems useful when choosing key management models behind each tool
(Chapter 3), and might interest some users (Chapter 5), most of our partici-
pants did not find it critical, considering that majority of the popular messag-
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ing tools have already adopted the key-directory based model, so that users
are not confronted with the choice of key management models when adopting
an encrypted communication tool currently. Also, we observed a strong risk
of misunderstandings that undermine educational goals. Previous work noted
that commonly used metaphors may fail because they are structural (what
the system looks like) rather than functional (what it can do) [67]. In line
with this, we observed that technical details were most effective when they
were most functional. In particular, emphasizing that the secret stays on one
user’s device (rather than at the app company, or shared with communicating
parties) appears to be a good way to improve users’ perception of security
without creating new confusion.
• Clarifying weaknesses is important. Participants’ recognized a lot of
value in clarifying what E2EE cannot protect against, as part of a holistic view
of its security (Chapters 3 and 5). Commercial companies may be hesitant to
call attention to drawbacks of their products, but our evidence suggests this
clarity is critical to fixing the broken mental models that can limit adoption.
• Explaining integrity and authenticity may not be worth it. Our un-
successful explanations of integrity and authenticity in Chapter 5, combined
with prior related findings, suggest that conveying these nuanced concepts ef-
fectively will continue to be challenging. Relatively few participants regarded
these concepts as important in themselves; instead, most participants absorbed
them into their model of confidentiality, which they did see as important. (This
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aligns with the approach given in [6] of redefining authenticity in terms of con-
fidentiality.) As such, we recommend against trying to explain integrity and
authenticity independently.
• Strive for simplicity Various comments from our critique session in Chap-
ter 5 demonstrate that jargon words not only obstruct users’ understanding,
but also annoy them. Relatedly, participants generally frowned on overly
complex explanations, whereas simple explanations were both preferred in cri-
tiques and more likely to be repeated in the design task. All the texts we
examined appear to have been written to be colloquial, but we suggest even
further simplification.
We hope that these recommendations can inform the design of interventions
that can be integrated more naturally into users’ communication workflows. In
particular, they must be validated with broader demographics and in situations
when learning about E2EE is not the user’s primary task. Future work should
also examine how to tie these high-level mental models more directly to concrete
tasks such as choosing a communication medium, turning on E2EE mode (when not
automated), or performing an authentication ceremony. Besides of system designers,
our work also magnifies the role of journalists, security commentators, and other
opinion-makers whose recommendations users often rely on instead, and we hope
our findings from this dissertation could better help them when communicating
end-to-end encryption to the general public.
Overall, we believed that continued education from all community, discussions
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in the media, and more frequent engagement with encryption tools in daily life may
all assist in broader adoption and more effective use of communications tools.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we investigated the adoption of end-to-end encrypted com-
munication from a variety of user-centered perspectives.
We begin with understanding how general users balance the usability and se-
curity tradeoffs for different key management models in end-to-end encryption. We
found that users could understand at least some high-level security properties and
could coherently trade these properties off against factors like convenience. We
found that while participants recognized that the exchange model could provide
better overall privacy, they also recognized its potential for self-defeating mistakes.
Similarly, our participants acknowledged potential security problems in the regis-
tration model, but found it “good enough” for many everyday purposes, especially
when offered the option to audit the system and/or split trust among several par-
ties. Therefore, trying to convince average users to exclusively use more complicated
schemes, when they often don’t see a need for the added protection, may instead
keep them away from using any encryption at all. Rather than spreading undue
139
alarm about the risks of key-directory based models, or forcing users into only ex-
change models, we recommend that policymakers and designers present tradeoffs
clearly and encourage adoption of usable but imperfect security for the many sce-
narios where it may be appropriate.
We then explored users’ tradeoffs for search in encrypted communications. We
found that privacy was the most important non-price feature to our participants,
and minimizing the use of local storage was almost as highly valued. These findings
suggested that in the email context, although local indexing may largely be suitable,
there might also be a niche for searchable encryption. For some users, the potential
reduction in privacy relative to a local index will be worthwhile, in order to save
on storage space. In particular, searchable encryption may have potential as a
compromise: more privacy than the current standard, in which email services have
plaintext access to all messages, while limiting some inconveniences that may prevent
broader adoption of end-to-end encryption.
Finally, we explored how to improve general users’ mental models of end-to-
end encryption. We designed a tutorial with four modules: a brief overview, risks
associated with non-E2EE communication, corrections to three common misconcep-
tions, and a high-level description of how E2EE works technically. We evaluated
what our participants learned, what misconceptions they retained, and which infor-
mation they found most valuable. We found that overall our tutorials were effective
at conveying high-level security properties of E2EE, including potential weaknesses
at endpoints. They also corrected certain existing misconceptions about who has
access to messages in transit. We found that the risks module effectively conveyed
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intended ideas about the relative risks of E2EE and non-E2EE communications, but
the misconceptions module did not effectively address confusion about integrity and
authenticity. The technical description increased understanding somewhat for some
participants, but also promoted misunderstanding for others, and was not considered
particularly important or useful. The critique activities, meanwhile, revealed several
points of confusion within existing messages. Overall, participants’ responses sug-
gested that emphasizing confidentiality, clearly conveying the limitations of E2EE
protections, and reducing complexity are the most important properties for effective
education. We hope that these recommendations can inform the design of interven-
tions that can be integrated more naturally into users’ communication workflows,
such as those on apps’ webpages, in their installation descriptions, or in interstitial
screens.
7.2 Future Directions
Extending evaluation of searchable encrypted communication. In Chap-
ter 4, we explored only a small subset of possible tradeoffs inherent in supporting
search for end-to-end encryption. Future work could apply similar approaches to
test a broader array of features (for example, latency) or to test more options for
each feature (a larger range of possible prices, more storage size options, or more
detailed breakdowns of privacy models).
Besides, our work didn’t ask or measure our participants’ current email be-
haviors, such as how they performed search in their daily life, how many emails
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they had, and how often they checked their emails both in laptops/PCs and mobile
phones. Future work could try to get these “ground truth” before asking par-
ticipants the choice questions, and compare how their perceptions extracted from
conjoint analysis differ.
Also, we acknowledged that expressed preferences, even in a conjoint analysis
study designed to operationalize relative value, do not always match real-world
behavior. As such, it would be useful to design a follow-up field study, in which
participants live with the consequences of the tradeoffs they select for days or weeks,
to see how this changes their opinions.
Designing effective educational materials. All of our work, either part or
the whole chapter, emphasized the importance to user education about end-to-end
encryption so that users could make better informed decisions when adopting and
using encrypted communication tools. In Chapters 3 and 5, we designed the educa-
tional materials about end-to-end encryption in PowerPoint slides, and conducted
the study in a tutorial-style scenario. In practice, of course, most users will not
have the time or interest to complete the tutorial like this. Therefore, based on
the key elements distilled from our study, future directions could derive more con-
cise, understandable and attractive educational materials, both in terms of content
and intervention, which can be integrated more naturally into users’ communication
workflows. This also applies to our work in Chapter 4 especially when presenting
the privacy levels to users. In particular, the new designed educational materials
should be validated with broader demographics and in situations when learning
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about E2EE is not the user’s primary task.
Also, future work could examine how to tie these high-level mental models
more directly to concrete tasks such as choosing a communication medium, turning
on E2EE mode (when not automated), or performing an authentication ceremony,
so that the community will have better insights about how improved mental mod-
els can potentially enable more adoption and effective use of end-to-end encrypted
communication tools.
Including authentication ceremony as part of the evaluation. As the first
step, our studies didn’t consider authentication ceremonies when evaluating users’
perceptions of and attitudes toward end-to-end encrypted communication. There-
fore, users’ opinions of usability and the sense of security might change if they
are exposed to performing authentication ceremonies within such tools. There are
several studies focusing on helping users complete the authentication ceremony in
these tools [6, 36, 37, 61]. However, these work either solely considered the usability
of ceremonies, or explained the reasons of performing this action very briefly to
participants. Thus, future work could consider including authentication ceremonies
on the basis of our studies, when evaluating the usability and security of encrypted
communication tools, and/or designing educational materials.
Evaluating the tradeoffs between end-to-end encryption and other con-
cerns. This dissertation focuses on how end-to-end encrypted communication could
help protect users’ online privacy. There are other possible tradeoffs we didn’t evalu-
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ate, which future work can examine more closely. For example, there is still ongoing
debate about whether the benefits of adopting end-to-end encryption will be out-
weighed by the threats to the national security [145]; whether the daily use of end-
to-end encryption is considered illicit, immoral or “paranoid”, except for protecting
privacy; and whether end-to-end encryption will get in the way of efficient spam and
malware detection within email and messaging tools. Better understanding those
tradeoffs will give the whole community a holistic view.
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Appendix A: Key Management Lab Study
This appendix contains the full survey and instructional instrument used in
our research.
• Section A.1 introduces the task and role-play to the participant.
• Section A.2 contains the introduction and explanation of the Exchange Model.
• Section A.3 contains the introduction and explanation of the Registration
Model.
• Section A.4 contains the post-task survey instrument.
• Section A.5 contains the demographic questionnaire.
A.1 Overall Introduction
Welcome to our experiment. Today you will use two systems. These systems
are developed to encrypt your emails so that your emails can be protected from being
read by email providers (such as Google and Yahoo!), governments (e.g. NSA), as
well as malicious attackers.
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In this experiment, pretend you are Henry, and you want to send and








Below is how Lock Exchange System works.
1. Every user can get a public lock and a private key.
2. Users have to exchange their public locks in some way.
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3. You can send encrypted emails with others’ public locks, so that others’ can
read the emails with their private keys.
4. Similarly, you can also read any encrypted emails that are encrypted to you
using your private key.
Task Instructions:
• Click the extension on upper right corner on tool bar in Chrome.
• Click “Options” for configuration.
147
1. Generate a public lock/private key pair.
Go to “Generate Lock and Key” to generate a public lock/ private key pair.
Note: The password is only for this study, and is NOT your email password.
DON’T use your real passwords associated with any of your account in real
life.
2. Exchange Public Locks with Alice.
(a) Go to “Display Lock/Key Pair” and click the lock/key pair you just
generated. Then export your public lock to Alice.
The public lock will start with “-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC LOCK
BLOCK-----”, and end with “-----END PGP PUBLIC LOCK BLOCK-----”
(Note: there are FIVE “-” in the beginning and in the end).
You can send your public lock by one or combination of ways that we
provide you.
(b) Then you will receive Alice’s public lock.
(c) Import Alice’s public lock into the extension.
3. Send an encrypted email to Alice
In the email interface, first click the encryption icon to write “What is your
favorite color” to Alice. If the icon doesn’t show up, please refresh the website.
Note: you need to encrypt for Alice.
4. Decrypt the received email from Alice.
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Move your mouse to the email body. When a lock icon appears, click on the
icon. You need your password (you created in step 3) to decrypt email.
Next you will send encrypted email to two recipients Bob and Carl.
5. Exchange Public Locks with Bob and Carl.
You can use the same way or different way provided in step 4 to exchange
public locks with Bob and Carl.
6. Send encrypted email to Bob and Carl.
Imagine that you are a financial secretary in your department, and you want
to send the payroll reports to Bob and Carl by encrypted email. For simplic-
ity, you can simply write “Here is your biweekly payroll summary: Salary is
$888.88, Tax is $88.88. Your subtotal: $800.00.” in the email body. You can
refer to previous steps to send encrypted email.
7. Decrypt the received email from Bob and Carl.
8. Imagine that you are still the financial secretary in your department, and you
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will send the payroll reports to 10 people by encrypted email, what will you
do? Please specify the steps.
9. Misconfiguration
(a) If you accidentally delete or lose Alice’s public lock, what will you do if
you want to send/receive encrypted email to/from Alice?
(b) If you accidentally delete or lose your own private key, what will you do
if you want to send/receive encrypted email to/from other recipients?
(c) If you accidentally publicize your own private key, what will you do if
you want to send/receive encrypted email to/from other recipients?
Possible Threats for Lock Exchange System:
These systems are developed to encrypt your emails so that your emails can
be protected from being read by email providers (such as Google and Yahoo!),
governments (e.g. NSA), as well as malicious attackers.
The threat may happen when you exchange public locks with others. When
you try to get the public lock from Dave, Mallet (can be any type of attacker from
above) secretly switches the public lock to his own. You think you get Dave’s public
lock, but in fact you get Mallet’s.
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Then when you send encrypted email to Dave, you actually use Mallet’s public
lock. As a result, Mallet can read your email. Mallet will consequently use Dave’s
public lock and send the encrypted email to Dave, so that both you and Dave don’t
realize the email has been read.
This threat doesn’t happen usually, because it requires Mallet to have much
power and resources to achieve this.
Please give your feedback about Lock Exchange System:
Note: We are evaluating these systems. We are not testing you. These systems
are not developed by us. Please leave your feedback as honestly as you can. Your
honest feedback, positive or negative, will help with our research.
For the first two questions, please note the difference between difficulty and
cumbersomeness. Difficult tasks are intellectually challenging and need effort or
skills to accomplish. Cumbersome tasks are tedious and need an unnecessarily long
time to accomplish.
Please rate your agreement with the following statements.
1. The following tasks were difficult.
(a) Generate the public lock and private key pair
(b) Exchange public lock with Alice
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(c) Send encrypted email to Alice
(d) Decrypt email from Alice
(e) Exchange public locks with Bob and Carl
(f) Send encrypted email to Bob and Carl
(g) Decrypt email from Bob and Carl
(h) Send and receive encrypted emails to 10 people
2. The following tasks were cumbersome.
(a) Generate the public lock and private key pair
(b) Exchange public locks with Alice
(c) Send encrypted email to Alice
(d) Decrypt email from Alice
(e) Exchange public locks with Bob and Carl
(f) Send encrypted email to Bob and Carl
(g) Decrypt email from Bob and Carl
(h) Send and receive encrypted emails to 10 people
3. This system effectively protected my privacy.
A.3 Registration Model
Instruction: Below is how Registration System works.
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1. Every user can get a public lock and a private key when you register.
2. Every user’s public lock will be automatically stored in a cloud database that
is run by the email provider.
3. You can send encrypted emails with others’ public locks, so that others’ can
read the emails with their private keys. The cloud database will return others’
public locks for you.
4. Similarly, you can also read any encrypted emails that are encrypted to you
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using your private key.
Task Instructions:
• Click the extension on the upper right corner on the tool bar in Chrome.
• Click “Options” for configuration.
1. Register
154
Go to “Register” to register your email account to the email provider server.
The registration will give you a public lock and a private key.
2. Send an encrypted email to Alice
In the email interface, first click the encryption icon to write “What is your
favorite color” to Alice. If the icon doesn’t show up, please refresh the website.
Note: you need to encrypt for Alice.
3. Decrypt the received email from Alice
You need your password (you created in step 3) to decrypt email.
Next you will send encrypted email to two recipients Bob and Carl.
4. Send encrypted email to Bob and Carl.
Imagine that you are a financial secretary in your department, and you want
to send the payroll reports to Bob and Carl by encrypted email. For simplic-
ity, you can simply write “Here is your biweekly payroll summary: Salary is
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$888.88, Tax is $88.88. Your subtotal: $800.00.” in the email body. You can
refer to previous steps to send encrypted email.
5. Decrypt the received email from Bob and Carl
6. Imagine that you are still the financial secretary in your department, and you
will send the payroll reports to 10 people by encrypted email, what will you
do? Please specify the steps.
7. Misconfiguration
(a) If you accidentally delete or lose your own private key, what will you do
if you want to send/receive encrypted email to/from other recipients?
(b) If you accidentally publicize your own private key, what will you do if
you want to send/receive encrypted email to/from other recipients?
Possible Threats for Registration System:
These systems are developed to encrypt your emails so that your emails can
be protected from being read by email providers (such as Google and Yahoo!),
governments (e.g. NSA), as well as malicious attackers.
There are two prototypes for Registration System. For the first prototype
(Model 1), the possible threats are as follows.
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The threat may happen when you send encrypted emails to others. For exam-
ple, when you try to send encrypted emails to Dave, you think the email provider
database will return Dave’s public lock to you. But in fact it returns Mallet’s, so
that Mallet can read your email. Therefore, you need to trust the email provider in
this system.
In the second prototype (Model 2), there is a third-party service (not the email
provider) as an intermediary. In this prototype, neither the third-party service nor
your email provider can read your email themselves. However, if your email provider
and the third-party service collaborate, they can both read your email. Therefore,
you need to trust that the two services are not collaborating.
Please give your feedback about Registration System:
Note: We are evaluating these systems. We are not testing you. These systems
are not developed by us. Please leave your feedback as honestly as you can. Your
honest feedback, positive or negative, will help with our research.
For the first two questions, please note the difference between difficulty and
cumbersomeness. Difficult tasks are intellectually challenging and need some effort
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or skills to accomplish. Cumbersome tasks are tedious and need an unnecessarily
long time to accomplish.
Rate your agreement with the following statements.
1. The following tasks were difficult.
(a) Register
(b) Send encrypted email to Alice
(c) Decrypt email from Alice
(d) Send encrypted email to Bob and Carl
(e) Decrypt email from Bob and Carl
(f) Send and receive encrypted emails to 10 people
2. The following tasks were cumbersome.
(a) Register
(b) Send encrypted email to Alice
(c) Decrypt email from Alice
(d) Send encrypted email to Bob and Carl
(e) Decrypt email from Bob and Carl
(f) Send and receive encrypted emails to 10 people
3. This system effectively protected my privacy.
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A.4 Overall Feedback
Please give your overall feedback about these two systems:
Note: Again, please give your honest feedback to help with our research.
1. Please rate your willingness to use these two systems in the future.
(a) I would like to use Lock Exchange System.
(b) I would like to use Registration System with Model 1.
(c) I would like to use Registration System with Model 2.
2. Below please rate your willingness to recommend these systems to others.
(a) I would like to recommend Lock Exchange System to others.
(b) I would like to recommend Registration System with Model 1 to others.
(c) I would like to recommend Registration System with Model 2 to others.
3. Please rate your agreement with the following statements.
(a) I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to
use Lock Exchange System.
(b) I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to
use Registration System.
(c) I would imagine that most people would learn to use Lock Exchange
System very quickly.
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(d) I would imagine that most people would learn to use Registration System
very quickly.
(e) I would need to learn a lot of things before I could get going with Lock
Exchange System.
(f) I would need to learn a lot of things before I could get going with Regis-
tration System.
4. What do you like or dislike for each system? Why?
In Model 3, the email provider will still store all users’ public locks, just
like Model 1. But there are other parties (auditors) who audit the email
provider, to ensure that the email provider is giving out correct public locks.
These auditors may include other email providers, public interest groups, and
software on your devices. If the email provider gives you a public lock that
doesn’t belong to the recipient, or gives someone else the wrong public lock for
you, these parties will notify you. You (or someone else) may use the wrong
lock temporarily (for an hour or a day) before you are notified.
In this model, you don’t need to trust any email provider, but you need to
trust the auditors and/or the software on your device. Because there are




1. Which of the following best describes your current occupation?
(a) Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations
(b) Office and Administrative Support Occupations
(c) Production Occupations
(d) Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations
(e) Computer and Mathematical Occupations
(f) Community and Social Service Occupations
(g) Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations
(h) Management Occupations
(i) Legal Occupations
(j) Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupations
(k) Food Preparation and Serving Related Occupations
(l) Architecture and Engineering Occupations
(m) Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media Occupations
(n) Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance Occupations
(o) Healthcare Support Occupations
(p) Construction and Extraction Occupations
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(q) Education, Training, and Library Occupations
(r) Protective Service Occupations
(s) Sales and Related Occupations
(t) Business and Financial Operations Occupations
(u) Transportation and Materials Moving Occupations
(v) Other (please specify)
2. Where did you grow up (primarily)?
(a) United States
(b) Other North America




(g) South Asia (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, etc.)
(h) East Asia (China, Japan, Korea, etc.)
(i) Central Asia
(j) The Middle East
(k) Australia / Oceania
(l) Other: [please specify]
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(m) I prefer not to answer







(g) I prefer not to answer
4. What is your gender?
(a) Male
(b) Female
(c) I prefer not to answer
5. Please tell us whether you have the following experiences (yes or no).
(a) I have attended a computer security conference in the past year.
(b) I have taken or taught a course in computer security before.
(c) Computer security is one of my primary job responsibilities.
(d) I have used SSH before.
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(e) I have configured a firewall before.
(f) I have a degree in an IT-related field (e.g. information technology, com-
puter science, electrical engineering, etc.)?
(g) I have an up-to-date virus scanner on my computer.
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Appendix B: Email Preference Study
Features Feature Descriptions Options











Can you search with a partial word instead of a




What can your email provider learn about your
email?
No privacy: Your email provider can read the contents
of all email and search queries. This is how most email
services currently work (Gmail, Yahoo! Mail, Outlook,
etc.).
Some privacy: Your email provider can read the
contents of certain emails and search queries, but not
all. The provider can choose specific topics of high
interest to learn about.
Maximum privacy: Your email provider cannot read
the contents of any emails or search queries.
Local
storage
How much local storage the service will use (on
your computer or phone)
Requires 5MB: equivalent to about 2-3 HD photos
Requires 500 MB: equivalent to about 200 HD photos




After using this email service on one device (a
phone or laptop) for several months, you buy a new
device. You set up the email service on your new
device. Can you read and search old emails on your
new device?)
Yes: read and search all email using the new device
both before and after its activation.
No: read and search only email after you configured the
new device. You can?t read and search old emails on
your new device.
Table B.1: Details of feature description in email preference study
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B.1 Survey Questionnaire
In this section, please imagine that you have been asked to recommend an
email service to a friend. In each of the following 16 questions, you will be provided
with descriptions of two different email services, which may differ in several features.
We will ask you to choose which email service you would recommend.
Some of the email services you are going to see are not currently available,
but we’d like you to imagine that they were available today. It is important
that you answer in the way you would if you were actually recommending email
services.
The details of feature description are shown in Table B.
B.2 Screenshots of Email Preference
This section contains the full 16 email service choice questions in our study.
During the survey, the sequence of questions was randomized for each participant.
Figure B.2.1: Question 1 (left) and Question 2 (right)
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Figure B.2.2: Question 3 (left) and Question 4 (right)
Figure B.2.3: Question 5 (left) and Question 6 (right)
Figure B.2.4: Question 7 (left) and Question 8 (right)
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Figure B.2.5: Question 9 (left) and Question 10 (right)
Figure B.2.6: Question 11 (left) and Question 12 (right)
Figure B.2.7: Question 13 (left) and Question 14 (right)
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Figure B.2.8: Question 15 (left) and Question 16 (right)
B.3 Web-Skill Scale and Privacy Perception
1. Web-Skill Scale
In this section, please tell us how familiar you are with the following computer
and Internet-related items. Please choose a number between 1 and 5, where 1








In this section, please tell us how much you agree with the following state-
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ments. Please choose a number between 1 and 7, where 1 represents “strongly
disagree” and 7 represents “strongly agree”.
(a) Consumer online privacy is really a matter of consumers? right to exer-
cise control and autonomy over decisions about how their information is
collected, used, and shared.
(b) Consumer control of personal information lies at the heart of consumer
privacy.
(c) I believe that online privacy is invaded when control is lost or unwillingly
reduced as a result of a marketing transaction.
(d) Companies seeking information online should disclose the way the data
are collected, processed, and used.
(e) A good consumer online privacy policy should have a clear and conspic-
uous disclosure.
(f) It is very important to me that I am aware and knowledgeable about how
my personal information will be used.
(g) It usually bothers me when online companies ask me for personal infor-
mation.
(h) When online companies ask me for personal information, I sometimes
think twice before providing it.
(i) It bothers me to give personal information to so many online companies.




There are 6 questions about your demographics.




(d) Prefer not to answer
2. Please specify your age? (number)
3. Please specify your ethnicity.
(a) Hispanic or Latino
(b) Black or African American
(c) White
(d) American Indian or Alaska Native
(e) Asian, Native Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander
(f) Other
(g) Prefer not to answer.
4. Please specify the highest degree or level of school you have completed.
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(a) Some high school credit, no diploma or equivalent
(b) High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED)







(j) Prefer not to answer.
5. Which of the following best describes your educational background or job field?
(a) I have an education in, or work in, the field of computer science, computer
engineering or IT.
(b) I DO NOT have an education in, nor do I work in, the field of computer
science, computer engineering or IT.
(c) Prefer not to answer.
6. Please specify the range which most closely matches your total, pre-tax, house-
hold income in 2016.
(a) <$29,999
(b) $30,000 - $49,999
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(c) $50,000 - $74,999
(d) $75,000 - $99,999
(e) $100,000 - $124,999
(f) $125,000 - $149,999
(g) $150,000 - $199,999
(h) $200,000 or more
(i) Prefer not to answer.
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Appendix C: End-to-End Encryption Education Study
C.1 Quiz Questions
Suppose TextLight is a messaging app which has end-to-end encryption (E2EE).
You send a message to your friend, Bob, using TextLight, to invite him to watch
the movie Star Wars tonight. Please answer the following questions based on your
understanding of end-to-end encryption (E2EE). [Note: all questions except Q9
were five-point Likert-scale choice questions: “Very difficult,” “Somewhat difficult,”
“Neutral,” “Somewhat easy,” “Very easy.”]
1. Suppose Dave could observe the communication between your phone and the
TextLight company, how difficult would it be for Dave to learn the contents
of your invitation message?
2. How difficult would it be for the TextLight company to learn the contents of
your invitation message?
3. Consider your Internet or mobile service provider, such as Comcast, Verizon,
AT&T, Sprint, etc. How difficult would it be for these service providers to
learn the contents of your invitation message?
4. If a hacker, Chuck successfully steals data that is stored in the computers
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at the TextLight company, how difficult would it be for Chuck to learn the
contents of your invitation message?
5. Some government intelligence or national security agencies (e.g. NSA) request
the TextLight company to hand over stored user messages to them. How
difficult would it be for these agencies to learn the contents of your invitation
message?
6. Suppose George has previously installed some malware on your phone which
could record your activities, how difficult would it be for George to learn the
contents of your invitation message?
7. How difficult would it be for someone (for example, a hacker) to modify mes-
sages between you and Bob during your conversation, so that Bob will receive
an invitation to watch the movie Jurassic Park, instead of Star Wars?
8. Suppose both your and Bob’s Textlight usernames and passwords are not
hacked/stolen/guessed by other people. How difficult would it be for someone
(for example, a hacker) to impersonate Bob in order to respond your invitation
message? For example, you receive a response message that seems to be from
Bob, but was actually sent by Frank.
9. Please sort the following tools based on how secure you feel using them, with
the most secure tool at the top.
(a) Sending messages using SMS text messaging app
(b) Making a direct landline/mobile phone call
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(c) Sending Email
(d) Sending messages in instant messaging apps with E2EE
(e) Sending messages in instant messaging apps without E2EE
C.2 Interview Questions
Now we will ask you some questions about how you feel about these slides.
1. Could you briefly recall what you have learned from our tutorial?
2. How difficult or easy to understand was our tutorial? [Very difficult, difficult,
neutral, Easy, Very easy]
3. How informative was our tutorial? [Very non-informative, non-informative,
neutral, informative, very informative]
4. What piece of the tutorial you think is most important to you to help you
learn E2EE? Why? What about non-important parts?
5. What part of the tutorial you think is most surprising to you? Least surpris-
ing? Why?
6. Suppose you want to teach E2EE to your family or friends who don?t know
E2EE before, what part of the tutorial do you want them to learn, or should
they know? Why?
7. What part of the tutorial you like or dislike, think (not) clear, or (not) well-
articulated?
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C.3 App Message Critique
Nowadays, some messaging apps also have E2EE. They also try to write some
short introductions to their users. Here are some of the examples. Please take
some time to read them. We anonymized these app names, and name them all as
TextLight 1.
C.3.1 App Messages
APP 1 - Line
Letter Sealing is a feature that provides end-to-end encryption (E2EE) for
chat room messages. E2EE is a communication system designed so that messages
saved on our servers are encrypted and cannot be read by anyone except the sender
and receiver of the message. Letter Sealing uses unique, user-specific encryption
keys which allow users to safely and securely send messages to one another.
APP 2 - WhatsApp
Many messaging apps only encrypt messages between you and them, but Text-
Light’s end-to-end encryption ensures only you and the person you’re communicating
with can read what is sent, and nobody in between, not even TextLight. This is
because your messages are secured with a lock, and only the recipient and you have
the special key needed to unlock and read them. For added protection, every mes-
1We replaced the names of all the apps with Textlight to mitigate effects of seeing certain brand
names.
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sage you send has its own unique lock and key. All of this happens automatically:
no need to turn on settings or set up special secret chats to secure your messages.
APP 3 - Telegram
All messages use end-to-end encryption. This means only you and the recipi-
ent can read those messages – nobody else can decipher them, including us here at
TextLight. TextLight can help when it comes to data transfer and secure communi-
cation. This means that all messages that you send and receive via TextLight cannot
be deciphered when intercepted by your ISP, network administrator or other third
parties. But please remember that we cannot protect you from your own mother if
she takes your unlocked phone without a passcode. Or from your IT-department if
they access your computer at work. Or from any other people that get physical or
root access to your phones or computers running TextLight.
APP 4 - Viber
On TextLight, end-to-end encryption is always turned on. Encryption keys
exist on user devices and nowhere else. So no one but you and the people you’re
communicating with can see your messages or hear your calls, not even TextLight.
The messages you send make their way from your device to the recipient in the form
of a code that only the recipient’s device can translate to plain text.
When your chats are protected by end-to-end encryption, no one has access
to them. Perhaps most importantly, TextLight doesn’t have access to them – which
means nothing you share can be used to target you later. TextLight can’t share
what it doesn’t have and, since TextLight doesn’t have access to the content of
your conversations, it can’t share it with third. So, you can be sure you won’t
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mysteriously start seeing ads related to something you were just talking about with
a friend on TextLight.
APP 5 - Threema
TextLight end-to-end encrypts all your messages. All encryption and decryp-
tion happen directly on the device, and the user is in control over the key exchange.
This guarantees that no third party – not even the server operators – can decrypt
the content of the messages and calls. Only the intended recipient, can read your
messages.
TextLight uses two different encryption layers to protect messages between the
sender and the recipient.
• End-to-end encryption layer: this layer is between the sender and the recipient.
• Transport layer: each end-to-end encrypted message is encrypted again for
transport between the client and the server, in order to protect the header
information.
The crucial part is that the end-to-end encryption layer passes through the server
uninterrupted; the server cannot remove the inner encryption layer.
APP 6 - ProtonMail
In TextLight, your data is encrypted in a way that makes it inaccessible to
us. Data is encrypted on the client side using an encryption key that we do not
have access to. This means we don’t have the technical ability to decrypt your
messages, and as a result, we are unable to hand your data over to third parties.
With TextLight, privacy isn’t just a promise, it is mathematically ensured.
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When you use E2EE to send a message to someone, no one monitoring the
network can see the content of your message – not hackers, not the government, and
not even the company (e.g. TextLight) that facilitates your communication.
This differs from the encryption that most companies already use, which only
protects the data in transit between your device and the company’s servers. For
example, when you send and receive a message using a service that does not provide
E2EE, the company has the ability to access the content of your messages because
they also hold the encryption keys. E2EE eliminates this possibility because the
service provider does not actually possess the decryption key. Because of this, E2EE
is much stronger than standard encryption.
C.3.2 Interview Questions
1. Generally speaking, what do you think of these introductions? [Followup: Do
you think these introductions can help general users understand E2EE better?]
2. Please use the green pen to mark the parts you think the introductions are
good, and use the red pen to mark the parts you think are not good. [Followup:
Why do you think these parts are (not) good?]
3. What else you might like these introductions to tell you?
4. Please choose the best one from these introductions.
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C.4 Message Design
Now you have learned our tutorial about E2EE, and have read some tutorials
used by some messaging apps. Could you design a short introduction if you want
to teach other people about end-to-end encryption? We don’t expect you to come
up with a long document describing every aspect of E2EE. Instead, please pick the
most important pieces you want to convey. Try to come up with the introduction
within 200 words.
C.4.1 Participants’ Designed Messages
1. O1: End-to-end encryption (E2EE) is a process that protects your messages
from third parties including but not limited to an individual, your app com-
pany or internet service provider. As a result, only the sender and intended
recipient of a message can view its contents. E2EE also protects messages
from being duplicated, impersonated or modified by third parties. Although
E2EE is a step forward in protecting user information, app companies are
still researching ways to secure user information when Malware software is
detected.
2. O2: E2EE is a tech that can protect your messages from any other third party
by controlling E2EE process happening directly on the device, so that only
the intended recipient can read your messages.
3. O3: End-to-end encryption, or E2EE, protects messages in that it only allows
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you (the user) and your intended audience to read the message. Data is
protected on the user side using an encryption that the messaging app company
- or any other third party (including hacker, the government, impersonators,
etc.) - have access to, therefore no one else can see the content of the message.
E2EE does not, however, protect receivers if malware has been installed in
their phone.
4. O4: Hey everyone, I want to share some important news about the safe and
secure software that can protect you, and your information you pass to another.
This software is called E2EE it provides end to end encryption protection
with messages and calls are exchanged and not even the providers can see it.
However if anyone is looking over your shoulder that the only possible way
your information can be shared. Overall this software is definitely something
to look into if you have privacy difficulties.
5. O5: E2EE is a great way to ensure that your messages will be securely trans-
mitted to the recipient of the message originally intended for. The data is
encrypted where no one has directed access to the text contents but the sender
and the receiver of the information. Not even the monitoring company, hack-
ers and the government can see the message being sent in the secure way. On
particular E2EE apps the encryption is always turned on the be coded and
will decode once the message has been fully received by the recipient. This
E2EE protects against message modification and impersonation. Not even
usernames and or passwords can be stolen or guessed.
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6. OR1: E2EE is a very useful and secure way of assuring its user’s that the con-
tents of their messages cannot be viewed or manipulated in any way, through-
out the transit and retrieval of the message. Unlike messaging apps that
choose not to use end-to-end encryption, messages with E2EE cannot even be
accessed by the app company themselves. As amazing as it may seem, the
only possible way for a hacker to access the encrypted information would be
if they had the ability to install malware on one’s phone.
7. OR2: The end-to-end encryption(E2EE) means only you and your intended
recipients can read the content of messages. Under non-E2EE situation, there
are risks in which your message can be subject to deciphering, interception and
modification. The internet service providers can get access to the content of
your messages during transit, the app company can can read your messages and
hand them to government agency when required. Moreover, a hacker can easily
intercept and modify your messages. Using E2EE can eliminate the possibility
of leaking the contents of your messages in situations mentioned before by
adding a shield to your message so that only you and the recipient can open
that shield. More importantly, no message modification and impersonation
will take place. However, E2EE can’t protect you from shoulder surfing, an
unreliable recipient or malware installed on your phone.
8. OR3: In TextLight, your data is protected with end-to-end encryption in
a way that no one except you and the person you are communicated with
can read your messages. This is because each message you send has its own
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encrypted lock and key so that not only us (the company) but also the internet
service providers and even the government CANNOT decrypt your messages
and hand over to third parties. Also, the encryption works automatically and
hence there is no need to turn on settings or set up special secrets chats.
9. OR4: There are more benefits than risks to using E2EE, or End-to-End
Encryption. E2EE mitigates some of the risks message senders are exposed
to in every day life while texting their friends, sending invitations through
Whatsapp, or communicating in other ways via instant messaging.
By using E2EE, this process creates a lock and key for your messages. When
you send a message using E2EE, the message travels from your Internet
Provider, through the messaging app servers, through the recipient’s Internet
Provider, and to the recipient. The lock prevents hackers, rogue employees,
and the app company/IP company themselves from viewing the messages,
and only the recipient has the key to unlock these messages. By using E2EE,
you decrease the likelihood that someone can hack into your phone. While
there are benefits to using E2EE, every day risks still pose a threat, like a
thief stealing your phone, someone looking over your shoulder, or if someone
installs malware on an unlocked phone.
10. OR5: E2EE is exceptionally important in protecting your information. Your
information is exposed every time you utilize your mobile device. There are
three potential exposures, the service providers, the app company, and hackers.
In efforts to protect yourself against these parties please ensure your devices
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has E2EE protection. This protection allows you information to remain secure
not even the company itself has an encryption key to decode, grant access to
other and leave your personal information unsecured. Additionally, one must
take precautions against those who shoulder surf and readily giving informa-
tion/ access to others (giving passwords or forwarding information). E2EE
is the best method of protection and all who utilize text messaging services
should utilize its services.
11. OM1: E2EE is an encryption used for securing your messaging. It sends an
signal through your internet, sends to whom your messaging. With a decrypted
message only they can see and open.
12. OM2: E2EE is a system which will allow for the safe and secure transmission
of messages. This will make it such that the message can only be viewed by
the sender and the intended recipient.
13. OM3: End to end encryption is the most secure platform to convey your
messages to the other user.It does not even let the network providers and the
company itself to access to our messages. We have a few misconceptions about
E2EE like we think that our information can be hacked or used by other agen-
cies be it government or non-government but it cannot. Along with this, we
think that mailing is the best and most secure method for communication but
what I have found is that apps with E2EE are more secure that E-mails, phone
messengers and phone calls. We just need to take care about the malwares
installed in our phone and if any other person can have access to our phone.
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14. OM4: When you use E2EE to send a message to someone, E2EE encrypts
the data in a way that makes it inaccessible to third parties, as the message is
being delivered. This means that the app company, internet service providers
(such as comcast or verizon), government agencies, and even hackers do not
have the ability to decrypt your messages. Additionally, the app is unable to
hand your data over to third parties. No one monitoring the network can see
the contents of your message.
15. OM5: End-to-end encryption means that each user has a key which only their
phone has. When travelling between service providers and the app company,
the message is encrypted and cannot be read until the key unlocks the message.
With normal message services, they hold the unencrypted messages which
could be read at any time, and third parties such as hackers or the government
could see the contents. The encryption algorithms are also very strong (so that
no hacker can break it), so the only way for somebody besides the intended
recipient to view the message contents is if their username or password is
stolen/revealed.
16. ORC1: I learned that E2EE is an end-to-end encryption that secure messages
between you and others. E2EE secures each messages with a key that you have
with each message sending out. Non E2EE is more vulnerable to hackers that
can intercept, edit, & view your outgoing messages. Government officials can
legally obtain messages from the app company or service provider no matter
how secure the encryption is. Sometimes message can also be lost in transit.
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17. ORC2: E2EE enables a more secure form of communication, making users
less vulnerable to security threats. Therefore, when a user is incentivized to
have secure communication, apps using E2EE should be utilized over non-
E2EE apps. While this is a general principle, it’s worth noting that messages
sent over E2EE are still vulnerable in some regards (just fewer parts than
when not using E2EE).
18. ORC3: All messages use end-to-end encryption. This means only you and the
recipient can read those messages - nobody else can decipher them, not even
TextLight. All messages that you send and receive via TextLight cannot be
deciphered when intercepted by your ISP, network administrator or any other
third parties. Unless your usernames and passwords are stolen or guessed,
there is no way that your messages could be modificated by a third person,
nor the impersonation could happen. Nothing you share can be used to target
you later. But please note that end to end encryption cannot protect your
messages from any other people that get physical or root access to your phones
or computers running TextLight.
19. ORC4: Do you ever wonder who may get access to your private messages/texts?
Nowadays, it is very easy for hackers to get your private information, but NOT
if you use TexLight app! TexLight is a specially-encrypted app that ensures
that only you and your intended recipient can view the messages. This en-
cryption is so secure that even the TexLight company cannot decrypt the
messages, so you can feel secure in your communication. Try out yourself by
187
downloading the app here.
20. ORC5: The advantage of using end-to-end encryption (E2EE) is that it pre-
vents your messages from being read when they are in transit and when they
are stored by the app company. Non-E2EE approaches can prevent messages
in transit from being compromised, but they are still at the risk of being ex-
posed to third parties if the app company itself compromised. For example,
non-E2EE cannot prevent the message from being exposed to:
(a) Rogue employees
(b) Requests by government agencies
(c) Hackers who find a way to access the app company’s servers
However, the downside is that both E2EE and non-E2EE apps are still at
risk when it comes to the user’s phone. Such cases include when malware is
installed or another person looks over the user’s shoulder as they type in their
passwords.
21. ORM1: End-to-end encryption is an encryption technique that utilizes user-
specific encryption keys that only the sender and receiver of messages have
access to. This encryption technique ensures that messages from one party
to another are secure during transit between parties and when the company
that stores the data for these messages is compromised. The algorithms that
are utilized here are extremely strong and would take third parties an im-
possible amount of time to crack and decrypt. End-to-end encryption is an
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essential tool to protect users’ privacy in the modern age, whether it be from
the government or private hackers.
22. ORM2: E2EE is a user friendly feature which protects both the sender and
receive, as a result of method the data is encrypted stored. The positive
capabilities eliminates the possibilities of a hacker intercepting messages or
restrict the company’s service provider’s from executing decryption keys to
decipher content. With TextLight, the software makes it vertically impossible
for unauthorized outsider to gain access since there’s no monitoring of the
network by the company or third parties.
23. ORM3: With other, non-encrypted messaging apps, your messages might be
vulnerable to hacking before reaching your recipient. With TextLight, your
message is automatically encrypted with a unique lock and key, ensuring only
you and your recipient can read what is sent. We use two layers of encryption
so that no one else– not even server operators or TextLight employees– can
access your message.
24. ORM4: Many apps, text messages, and even phone calls are not secure these
days. The government, hackers, and even phone companies can have access to
the content of your messages. People can even modify messages that you send
in between you and your friend. Thus, it is essential to find ways to provide
more security when communicating over the web. One way people do this is
through E2EE. It is a secure messaging app that makes it almost IMPOSSI-
BLE for people to gain access to the content of your message. For example, a
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messaging app that is E2EE may know that you have sent a message but they
do not know what the content is. This also eliminates risk of hackers. Even
if a hacker were to hack the company, they would not be able to alter or gain
access to your content. It is actually more secure than other platforms such
as text messages, imessage, emails, or even phone calls. It eliminates a lot of
risk. However, there are still some risks that can not be eliminated such as
someone looking over your shoulder while you’re texting. However, overall, it
is a more secure way for people to communicate via the web.
25. ORM5: End-to-end encryption otherwise as E2EE is a way to protect mes-
sages, phone calls, data transfers, and other similar things from being obtained.
E2EE does this by essentially putting a shell that is impenetrable around the
information being sent. This means that it is nearly impossible for someone
to break the shell and get the information that the shell is protecting. The
shell protects against everything such as the text messaging company, hack-
ers who try to intercept the message, or internet service providers. The only
time E2EE does not work is when a virus has already been placed on your
phone/computer, someone gets into your phone/computer, or whoever you are
sending the information shares it.
190
Bibliography
[1] A. Whitten and J. D. Tygar. Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt: A Usability Eval-
uation of PGP 5.0. In Proceedings of the 8th Conference on USENIX Security
Symposium - Volume 8, SSYM’99, pages 14–14, 1999.
[2] S. Sheng, L. Broderick, C. A. Koranda, and J. J. Hyland. Why Johnny still
Can’t Encrypt: Evaluating the Usability of Email Encryption Software. In
Proceedings of the Second Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, SOUPS
’06, 2006.
[3] Simson L. Garfinkel and Robert C. Miller. Johnny 2: A User Test of Key
Continuity Management with S/MIME and Outlook Express. In Proceedings
of the 2005 Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, SOUPS ’05, pages
13–24. ACM, 2005.
[4] Scott Ruoti, Nathan Kim, Ben Burgon, Timothy van der Horst, and Kent
Seamons. Confused Johnny: When Automatic Encryption Leads to Confusion
and Mistakes. In Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium on Usable Privacy and
Securit, pages 5:1–5:12. ACM, 2013.
[5] Ruba Abu-Salma, M. Angela Sasse, Joseph Bonneau, Anastasia Danilova,
Alena Naiakshina, and Matthew Smith. Obstacles to the Adoption of Secure
Communication Tools. In Proc. of IEEE Security and Privacy, pages 137–153,
May 2017.
[6] Elham Vaziripour, Justin Wu, Mark O’Neill, Jordan Whitehead, Scott Heid-
brink, Kent Seamons, and Daniel Zappala. Is that you, Alice? A Usability
Study of the Authentication Ceremony of Secure Messaging Applications. In
Proc. of SOUPS ’17, pages 29–47, Santa Clara, CA, 2017. USENIX Associa-
tion.
[7] Elham Vaziripour, Justin Wu, Mark O’Neill, Daniel Metro, Josh Cockrell,
Timothy Moffett, Jordan Whitehead, Nick Bonner, Kent Seamons, and Daniel
191
Zappala. Action Needed! Helping Users Find and Complete the Authentica-
tion Ceremony in Signal. In Proc. of SOUPS ’18, pages 47–62, Baltimore,
MD, 2018. USENIX Association.
[8] Justin Wu and Daniel Zappala. When is a Tree Really a Truck? Explor-
ing Mental Models of Encryption. In Proc. of SOUPS ’18, pages 395–409,
Baltimore, MD, 2018. USENIX Association.
[9] G. Kumparak. Apple Explains Exactly How Secure iMessage really
is. TechCrunch, February 2014. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/27/
apple-explains-exactly-how-secure-imessage-really-is/.
[10] Apple. The Most Personal Technology Must Also Be the Most Private. https:
//www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-privacy/, March 2016.
[11] C. Cattiaux and gg. iMessage Privacy. http://blog.quarkslab.com/
imessage-privacy.html, October 2013.
[12] N. Weaver. iPhones, the FBI, and Going Dark. Lawfare, August 2015. https:
//www.lawfareblog.com/iphones-fbi-and-going-dark.
[13] Natasha Lomas. WhatsApp Completes End-to-End En-
cryption Rollout. http://techcrunch.com/2016/04/05/
whatsapp-completes-end-to-end-encryption-rollout/, April 2016.
[14] S. Somogyi. Making End-to-End Encryption Easier to Use. Google online secu-
rity blog, June 2014. http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2014/
06/making-end-to-end-encryption-easier-to.html.
[15] I. Paul. Yahoo Mail to Support End-to-End PGP Encryption by 2015.
PCWorld, August 2015. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2462852/
yahoo-mail-to-support-end-to-end-pgp-encryption-by-2015.html.
[16] Google. Google End-To-End wiki. https://github.com/google/
end-to-end/wiki, December 2014.
[17] Susan E McGregor, Polina Charters, Tobin Holliday, and Franziska Roesner.
Investigating the Computer Security Practices and Needs of Journalists. In
24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 15), pages 399–414.
USENIX Association, 2015.
[18] S. Gaw, E. W. Felten, and P. Fernandez-Kelly. Secrecy, Flagging, and Para-
noia: Adoption Criteria in Encrypted Email. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’06, pages 591–
600, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[19] M. S. Melara, A. Blankstein, J. Bonneau, E. W. Felten, and M. J. Freedman.
CONIKS: Bringing Key Transparency to End Users. In 24th USENIX Secu-
rity Symposium (USENIX Security 15), pages 383–398. USENIX Association,
August 2015.
192
[20] Marta E. Cecchinato, Abigail Sellen, Milad Shokouhi, and Gavin Smyth. Find-
ing Email in a Multi-Account, Multi-Device World. In Proc. of CHI ’16, pages
1200–1210. ACM, 2016.
[21] Qingyao Ai, Susan T. Dumais, Nick Craswell, and Dan Liebling. Character-
izing Email Search Using Large-scale Behavioral Logs and Surveys. In Proc.
of WWW ’17, pages 1511–1520, 2017.
[22] David Carmel, Liane Lewin-Eytan, Alex Libov, Yoelle Maarek, and Ariel Ra-
viv. The Demographics of Mail Search and Their Application to Query Sug-
gestion. In Proc. of WWW ’17, pages 1541–1549, 2017.
[23] Dawn Xiaoding Song, D. Wagner, and A. Perrig. Practical Techniques for
Searches on Encrypted Data. In Proc. of IEEE Security and Privacy, pages
44–55, 2000.
[24] Reza Curtmola, Juan Garay, Seny Kamara, and Rafail Ostrovsky. Searchable
Symmetric Encryption: Improved Definitions and Efficient Constructions. In
Proc. of CCS ’06, pages 79–88. ACM, 2006.
[25] Seny Kamara, Charalampos Papamanthou, and Tom Roeder. Dynamic
Searchable Symmetric Encryption. In Proc. of CCS ’12, pages 965–976. ACM,
2012.
[26] Seny Kamara and Charalampos Papamanthou. Parallel and Dynamic Search-
able Symmetric Encryption, pages 258–274. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013.
[27] Emil Stefanov, Charalampos Papamanthou, and Elaine Shi. Practical Dy-
namic Searchable Encryption with Small Leakage. In NDSS ’14. Internet
Society, 2014.
[28] Raphael Bost. ΣOΦOς: Forward Secure Searchable Encryption. In Proc. of
CCS ’16, pages 1143–1154, 2016.
[29] Paul E. Green and V. Srinivasan. Conjoint Analysis in Marketing: New Devel-
opments with Implications for Research and Practice. Journal of Marketing,
54(4):3–19, 1990.
[30] Henrik Sattler and Adriane Hartmann. Commercial Use of Conjoint Analysis,
pages 103–119. Gabler, Wiesbaden, 2008.
[31] Marco Vriens. Solving Marketing Problems with Conjoint Analysis. Journal
of Marketing Management, 10(1-3):37–55, 1994.
[32] Yu Pu and Jens Grossklags. Towards a Model on the Factors Influencing Social
App Users’ Valuation of Interdependent Privacy. In Proc. of PETS ’16, pages
61–81, 2016.
193
[33] Hanna Krasnova, Thomas Hildebrand, and Oliver Guenther. Investigating the
Value of Privacy in Online Social Networks: Conjoint Analysis. In ICIS ’09
Proc., 2009.
[34] Daniel Burda and Frank Teuteberg. Understanding the Benefit Structure of
Cloud Storage as a Means of Personal Archiving - a Choice-Based Conjoint
Analysis. In ECIS ’14, 2014.
[35] Alexander De Luca, Sauvik Das, Martin Ortlieb, Iulia Ion, and Ben Laurie.
Expert and Non-Expert Attitudes towards (Secure) Instant Messaging. In
Proc. of SOUPS ’16, pages 147–157, Denver, CO, 2016.
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